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Abstract
Search over encrypted data recently became a critical operation that
raised a considerable amount of interest in both academia and industry, es-
pecially as outsourcing sensitive data to cloud proves to be a strong trend to
benefit from the unmatched storage and computing capacities thereof. In-
deed, privacy-preserving search over encrypted data, an apt term to address
privacy related issues concomitant in outsourcing sensitive data, has been
widely investigated in the literature under different models and assumptions.
Although its benefits are welcomed, privacy is still a remaining concern that
needs to be addressed. Some of those privacy issues can be summarized as:
submitted search terms and their frequencies, returned responses and their
relevancy to the query, and retrieved data items may all contain sensitive
information about the users.
In this thesis, we propose two different multi-keyword search schemes that
ensure users’ privacy against both external adversaries including other autho-
rized users and cloud server itself. The proposed schemes use cryptographic
techniques as well as query and response randomization. Provided that the
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security and randomization parameters are appropriately chosen, both the
search terms in the queries and the returned responses are protected against
privacy violations. The scheme implements strict security and privacy re-
quirements that essentially can hide similarities between the queries that
include the same keywords.
One of the main advantages of all the proposed methods in this work is
the capability of multi-keyword search in a single query. We also incorporate
effective ranking capabilities in the proposed schemes that enable user to
retrieve only the top matching results. Our comprehensive analytical study
and extensive experiments using both real and synthetic data sets demon-
strate that the proposed schemes are privacy-preserving, effective, and highly
efficient.
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S¸I˙FRELENMI˙S¸ BULUT VERI˙SI˙ U¨ZERI˙NDE
MAHREMI˙YET KORUMALI ve SIRALAMALI KELI˙ME
ARAMA
Cengiz O¨rencik
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mu¨hendislig˘i
Doktora Tezi, 2014
Tez Danıs¸manı: Erkay Savas¸
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Arama Yapılabilir S¸ifreleme, Mahremiyet, Bulut
Bilis¸im, Sıralama, Uygulamalı Kriptografi, Homomorfik S¸ifreleme
O¨zet
Hem akademik hem de endu¨stri c¸evrelerinde, hassas bilgi ic¸eren verilerin
bulut hizmeti veren firmalara aktarılması akımının bas¸lamasıyla, s¸ifrelenmis¸
veri u¨zerinde arama yapmak c¸ok kritik ve o¨nemli bir is¸lem haline geldi. Bulut
yapısının, c¸ok yu¨ksek depolama ve hesaplama kapasitesini uygun fiyatlarla
kullanıcılara sunuyor olması, bu akımın temel c¸ıkıs¸ noktasıdır. Problemin
o¨neminden dolayı, s¸ifrelenmis¸ veri u¨zerinde mahremiyet korumalı arama yap-
mak, literatu¨rde farklı modeller altında genis¸ c¸aplı bir s¸ekilde incelenmis¸tir.
Bulut yapısının faydaları kabul edilmekle birlikte, aktarılan verilerin mahremiyeti
konusu hala c¸o¨zu¨lmesi gereken bir problemdir. Sorgu sırasında go¨nderilen
anahtar terimlerin ic¸erig˘i, sorgu terimlerinin kullanım sıklıg˘ı, geri do¨nen ver-
ilerin ic¸erig˘i, bu verilerin sorgu ile ne oranda o¨rtu¨s¸tu¨g˘u¨ gibi bilgilerin tamamı
kullanıcılarla ilgili hassas bilgiler olarak nitelendirilebilir. Mahremiyet koru-
malı arama metotları, bu hassas bilgilerin korunmasını hedeflemektedir.
Bu c¸alıs¸mada iki farklı mahremiyet korumalı anahtar kelime arama yo¨ntemi
o¨neriyoruz. Her iki yo¨ntem de, hem bas¸ka kullanıcılara kars¸ı, hem de bulut
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sunucusunun kendisine kars¸ı verilerin mahremiyetini sag˘lıyor. Mahremiyeti
sag˘lamak ic¸in, kriptografik yo¨ntemlerin yanı sıra, sorguları ve do¨nen cevapları
rastgele hale getirme yo¨ntemlerinden de faydalanıyoruz. Gu¨venlik parame-
trelerinin dog˘ru bir s¸ekilde ayarlanması sag˘landıg˘ı taktirde, o¨nerdig˘imiz yo¨ntemler
hem sorguların hem de buluta aktarılan verilerin mahremiyetini koruyacak
niteliktedir. O¨nerdig˘imiz yo¨ntemler arama yapmanın dıs¸ında, es¸les¸en verileri
sorgu ile alakalarına go¨re sıralama o¨zellig˘ine de sahiptir. Bu o¨zellik sayesinde
sadece sorgu ile en alakalı es¸les¸meler do¨ndu¨ru¨lebilmektedir. Hem gerc¸ek, hem
de sentetik olarak yaratılmıs¸ veri ku¨meleri u¨zerinde yaptıg˘ımız detaylı anali-
zler, o¨nerdig˘imiz yo¨ntemlerin mahremiyeti koruyan ve yu¨ksek oranda dog˘ru
sonuc¸ları hızlı bir s¸ekilde do¨ndu¨rebilen yapılar oldug˘unu go¨stermektedir.
vii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The data storage requirements increase as huge amounts of data need to be
accessible for users. The associated storage and communication requirements
are a huge burden on organizations, which show, a strong proclivity of out-
sourcing their data to remote servers. Outsourcing data to clouds provides
effective solutions to users that have limited resource and expertise for stor-
age and distribution of huge data at low costs. However, data outsourcing
engenders serious privacy concerns. Protecting the privacy is an essential re-
quirement, since the cloud providers are not necessarily trusted. Therefore,
some precautions are required to protect the sensitive data from both the
cloud server and any other non-authorized party.
Cloud computing has the potential of revolutionizing the computing land-
scape. Indeed, many organizations that need high storage and computational
power tend to outsource their data and services to clouds. Clouds enable its
customers to remotely store and access their data by lowering the cost of
hardware ownership while providing robust and fast services [1]. It is ex-
pected that by 2015, more than half of Global 1000 enterprises will utilize
external cloud computing services and by 2016, all Global 2000 will benefit
1
from cloud computing to a certain extent [2].
1.1 Motivation
While its benefits are welcomed in many quarters, some issues remain to
be solved before a wide acceptance of cloud computing technology. The
security and privacy of remote data, are among the most important issues,
if not the most important. Particularly, the importance and necessity of
privacy-preserving search techniques are even more pronounced in the cloud
applications. The large companies that operate the public clouds like Google
Cloud Platform [3], Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud [4] or Microsoft Live
Mesh [5] may access the sensitive data such as search and access patterns.
Hence, hiding the query and the retrieved data has great importance in
ensuring the privacy and security of those using cloud services. A trivial
approach can be encrypting the data before sharing with the cloud. However,
the advantage of the cloud data storage is completely lost if data cannot be
selectively searched and retrieved. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf private key
encryption methods are not suitable for applying search over cipher-text.
One of the most important operations on the remote data is the secure
search operation. Although there are several approaches for searchable en-
cryption, the basic setting is almost the same for all. There is a set of
authorized users and a single or multiple semi-trusted servers. The data is
assumed to be accessible to the authorized users. Due to the sensitive nature
of the documents, the users do not want the server or other users to learn
the content of their documents. Moreover, due to the number of users, the
search operations can be executed very frequently. Hence, the search opera-
tion should not only protect the privacy of the users and the data but also
2
should be highly efficient.
To facilitate search on encrypted data, an encrypted index structure (i.e.,
secure index) is stored in the server along with the encrypted data. The
authorized users have access to a trapdoor generation function which enables
them to generate valid trapdoors for any arbitrary keyword. This trapdoor
is used in the server to search for the intended keyword. It is assumed that
the server does not have access to the trapdoor generation function, and
therefore, can not ascertain the keyword searched for. We assume all the
entities in the system are semi-honest and do not collude with each other.
Considering the large data set sizes, a single keyword search query usually
matches with lots of data items, where only few are relevant. Moreover, users
need to apply several queries and take the intersection of the corresponding
results, which impose a serious burden of both computation and time on
the user. A multi-keyword search, instead can incorporate a conjunction of
several keywords in a single query. Moreover, instead of returning undiffer-
entiated results, the matching results can further be ranked according to the
relevancy to the query. By increasing the search constraints and applying
ranking, only the most relevant items will be returned to the user, which
reduces both the computation and communication burden on user.
A typical scenario that benefits from our proposal is that a company out-
sources its document server to a cloud service provider. Authorized users
or customers of the company can perform search operations using certain
keywords on the cloud to retrieve the relevant documents. The documents
may contain sensitive information about the company, and similarly, the
keywords that the users search may give hints about the content of the doc-
uments hence, both must be hidden. Furthermore, the queried keywords
themselves may reveal sensitive information about the users as well, which
3
is considered to be a privacy violation by users if learned by others.
In this thesis, we propose two different novel privacy-preserving and effi-
cient multi-keyword search methods. The both methods return the matching
data items in a rank-ordered manner.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents two novel multi-keyword search methods for applying
secure search over encrypted cloud data. The design of a secure search (i.e.,
searchable encryption) method is challenging since it must satisfy strict pri-
vacy requirements while still being highly efficient.
The major results of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We adapt some of the existing formal definitions for the security and
privacy requirements of keyword search on encrypted cloud data for
our problem and also introduce some new privacy definitions.
• We propose two multi-keyword search schemes. The first one is based
on keyed cryptographic hash functions. The second one is based on
locality sensitive hashing (LSH) (i.e., MinHash), which ensures privacy
and security requirements in the most strict sense.
• We utilize ranking approaches for the both search methods that base
on term frequencies (tf) and inverse document frequencies (idf) of the
keywords. The proposed ranking approaches prove to be efficient to
implement and effective in returning documents highly relevant to the
submitted queries.
• We apply the search method on a two server setting that averts correla-
tion of a query with the corresponding matching document identifiers.
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• For the MinHash based search method, we utilize a novel approach that
reduces the number of encryption and the communication overhead by
more than 50 times through combining several encryption in a single
cipher-text.
• We provide formal proofs that the proposed methods are privacy-preserving
in accordance with the defined requirements.
• We implement the proposed schemes and demonstrate that it is efficient
and effective by experimenting with both real and synthetic data sets.
1.3 Outline
The organization of this thesis is as follows: The literature on secure search is
reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, . In Chapter 3, we examine the related well
known topics that are going to be used throughout the thesis. In Chapter 4,
we introduce our first secure keyword search approach that is based on HMAC
functions. The experimental results and security proofs of this approach are
also provided in this chapter. In Chapter 5, we provide yet another secure
search method which is based on locality sensitive hash (LSH) functions. We
propose two different models in this LSH based method. The first one is a
single server method which is very efficient but has some security flows. The
second one, two server model, provides better security requirements but it is
slower than the single server model due to required homomorphic encryption
operations. The formal security analysis and extensive cost analysis of both
single and two server models are provided in this section. Finally, in Chapter
6 we conclude the thesis.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving search over encrypted data and searchable encryption
methods have been extensively studied in recent years. A trivial approach is
sending a copy of the entire encrypted data set to the user and let the user
does the search. This trivial approach provides information theoretic privacy
since the server cannot learn any information about the searched keywords or
accessed files. Nevertheless, this approach brings an enormous computation
burden on the user and do not benefit from the utilities of cloud comput-
ing. Any useful method for search over encrypted data must provide better
efficiency compared to the trivial approach.
There are three main models in search over encrypted data methods [6].
The first model is the vendor system. In this scenario, the data stored on a
server is public, but the user wants to apply search without revealing the in-
formation on the data accessed, to the server administrator. Private Informa-
tion Retrieval (PIR) protocols provide solutions for this scenario [7, 8, 9, 10].
The problem of PIR was first introduced by Chor et al. [7]. Later, Groth
et al. [11] propose a multi-query PIR method with constant communication
rate. However, the computational complexity of the server in this method is
6
very inefficient to be used in large databases. On the other hand, PIR does
not address as to how the user learns which data items are most relevant to
his inquiries.
The second scenario is the store and forward system, where a user can
apply search over the data which is encrypted under the user’s public key.
This scenario is suitable for secure email applications, where the senders know
the receivers’ public keys. A public key encryption with keyword searching
(PEKS) scheme for this scenario, was first proposed by Boneh et al. [12].
Several subsequent improvements on the PEKS method are proposed [6, 13,
14, 15]; both for single and conjunctive keyword search settings.
The third model is the public storage system (i.e., database outsourcing
scenario), where a user outsources his sensitive data to a remote server in
an encrypted form. Several authorized users can then apply search over the
encrypted data, without leaking any sensitive information about the queried
keywords to the remote database administrator. In this thesis, we consider
the public storage system scenario.
Related work for this scenario can be analyzed in two major groups:
single keyword and multi-keyword search. While the user can only search for
a single feature (e.g., keyword) per query in the former, the latter enables
search for a conjunction of several keywords in a single query.
Most of the privacy-preserving keyword search protocols existing in the
literature provide solutions for single keyword search. Goh [16] proposes a se-
curity definition for formalization of the security requirements of searchable
symmetric encryption schemes. One of the first privacy-preserving search
protocols is proposed by Ogata and Kurosawa [17] using RSA blind signa-
tures. The scheme is not very practical due to the heavyweight public key
operations per database entry that should be performed on the user side.
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Later, Curtmola et al. [18] provides adaptive security definitions for privacy-
preserving keyword search protocols and proposes a scheme that satisfies the
requirements given in the definitions. Another single keyword search scheme
is proposed by Wang et al. [19] that keeps an encrypted inverted index to-
gether with relevancy scores for each keyword-document pair. This method
is one of the first work that is capable of ranking the results according to
their relevancy with the search term. Recently, Kuzu et al. [20] proposed an-
other single keyword search method that uses locality sensitive hashes (LSH)
and satisfies adaptive semantic security. Different from the other work, this
scheme is a similarity search scheme, which means that matching algorithm
works even if typos exist in the query.
All the work that are given above, are only capable of conducting single
keyword search. However, in the typical case of search over encrypted data for
public storage system scenario, the size of the outsourced data set is usually
huge and single keyword search will inevitably return an excessive number
of matches, where most will be irrelevant for the user. Multi-keyword search
allows more constraints in the search query and enables the user to access
only the most relevant data. Raykova et al. [21] proposed a solution using
a protocol called re-routable encryption. They introduce a new agent called
query router (QR) between the user and the server. User sends the queries
to the server through the QR to protect his anonymity with respect to the
server. Security of the user’s message with respect to the QR is satisfied
by confidentiality (i.e., encryption). They utilize bloom filters for efficient
search. Although this work is presented as a single keyword search method,
the authors also show a trivial multi-keyword extension. Wang et al. [22]
proposed a multi-keyword search scheme, which is secure under the random
oracle model. The method uses a hash function to map keywords into a fixed
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length binary array. Later, Cao et al. [23] proposed another multi-keyword
search scheme that encodes the searchable database index into two binary
matrices and uses inner product similarity during matching. This method is
inefficient due to huge matrix operations and it is not suitable for ranking.
Bilinear pairing based solutions for privacy-preserving multi-keyword search
are also presented in the literature [15, 24, 25]. In contrast to other multi-
keyword search solutions that are based on either hashing or matrix multi-
plications, the results returning from bilinear pairing based solutions are free
from false negatives and false positives (i.e., only the correct results return).
However, computation costs of pairing based solutions are prohibitively high
both on the server and on the user side. Moreover, bilinear pairing based
schemes provide neither any additional privacy for hiding access or search
patterns of users, nor any solution for ranking the matching results accord-
ing to their relevancy with the queries. Therefore, pairing based solutions
are not practical for many applications.
The privacy definition for almost all of the existing efficient privacy-
preserving search schemes, proposed for the public storage system, allows
the server to learn some information due to efficiency concerns. Although
the data is encrypted, it may not always ensure privacy. If an adversary
can observe a user’s access pattern (i.e., which items are accessed) to an
encrypted storage, some information about the user can still be learned. In
the case, there is a need for hiding the access patterns, Oblivious RAM [26]
methods can be utilized for the document retrieval process. Oblivious RAM
hides the access pattern by continuously applying a re-order process on the
memory as it is being accessed. Since in each access, the memory location
of the same data is different and independent of any previous access, the
access pattern is not leaked. However the Oblivious RAM methods are not
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practical even for medium sized data sets due to incurred polylogarithmic
overhead. Specifically, in real world setups ORAM yields execution times
of hundreds to thousands of seconds per single data access [26]. Recently
Stefanov et al. [27] present a simple Oblivious RAM protocol with a small
amount of client storage, named Path ORAM. The method Path ORAM re-
quires log2N/ logX bandwidth overhead for block size B = X logN , which is
asymptotically better than the best known ORAM scheme with small client
storage for block sizes bigger than Ω(log2N).
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Chapter 3
PRELIMINARIES
The fundamental problem of search over encrypted data is examining the
similarity between queries and encrypted data items. We use two different
encryption methods, homomorphic encryption and PCPA-secure encryption,
for ensuring the privacy of the data. Similarly two different hash functions,
MinHash and HMAC, are used to deduce a similarity between secure index
entries of the sensitive data and an encrypted query. We also utilize some of
the well-known metrics used in information systems to estimate the order of
relevancy of the matching results. In this Chapter, we present the definitions
and the basics of these techniques.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a type of encryption that allows some opera-
tions on the ciphertext, where the result of the operation is an encrypted
version of the actual result. For instance, two numbers, encrypted with ho-
momorphic property, can be securely added or multiplied without revealing
the unencrypted individual numbers.
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Homomorphic encryption schemes are suitable for various applications
such as e-voting, multi-party computation and secure search. Due to the
importance of the homomorphic property, several partially or fully homo-
morphic cryptosystems are proposed in the literature. While partially homo-
morphic encryptions provide either addition or multiplication operation, fully
homomorphic systems can provide both at the same time but less efficiently.
We present some homomorphic cryptosystems in the following sections.
3.1.1 Unpadded RSA
In the RSA encryption [28] method, if the public key modulus is m, the
exponent is e and the private message is x ∈ Zm, the encryption is defined
as:
Enc(x) = xe mod m
The homomorphic property is then,
Enc(x1) · Enc(x2) = xe1xe2 mod m
= (x1 · x2)e mod m
= Enc(x1 · x2).
3.1.2 Paillier
In the Paillier cryptosystem [29], if the public key modulus is m and the base
is g and the private message is x ∈ Zm, the encryption is defined as:
Enc(x) = gx · rc mod m2,
where r ∈ Z∗m is randomly chosen.
The Paillier cryptosystem has the following two homomorphic properties:
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• Enc(x1) · Enc(x2) = Enc(x1 + x2)
• Enc(x1)x2 = Enc(x1 · x2)
These homomorphic properties can be shown as,
Enc(x1) · Enc(x2) = (gx1 · rm1 )(gx2 · rm2 ) mod m2
= gx1+x2 · (r1r2)m mod m2
= Enc(x1 + x2 mod m).
Enc(x1)
x2 = (gx1 · rm1 )x2 mod m2
= gx1·x2 · (rx21 )m mod m2
= gx1·x2 · (r3)m mod m2
= Enc(x1 · x2 mod m).
The Paillier cryptosystem provides semantic security against chosen-plaintext
attacks. Intuitively, given the knowledge of the ciphertext (and length) of
some unknown message, it is not feasible to extract any additional informa-
tion on the message.
3.1.3 Damgard-Jurik
The Damgard-Jurik [30] cryptosystem is a generalization of the Paillier cryp-
tosytem, where the modulus is ms+1 instead of m2 for some s ≥ 1. If the
public key modulus is m and the base is g and the private message is x ∈ Zms ,
the encryption is defined as:
Enc(x) = gx · rms mod ms+1,
where r ∈ Z∗ms+1 is randomly chosen.
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The homomorphic property is then,
Enc(x1) · Enc(x2) = (gx1 · rms1 )(gx2 · rm
s
2 ) mod m
s+1
= gx1+x2 · (r1r2)ms mod ms+1
= Enc(x1 + x2 mod m
s).
3.1.4 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
The homomorphic encryption methods given above provide either additive
or multiplicative homomorphic property. The cryptosystems that supports
both additive and multiplicative homomorphic encryption are known as fully
homomorphic encryption. These methods are very powerful such that any
circuit can be homomorphicly evaluated without revealing any of the the
unencrypted parameters.
The first fully homomorphic encryption system is proposed by Craig Gen-
try [31] which utilizes lattice-based cryptography. Later some subsequent
work [32, 33] are proposed on fully homomorphic encryption systems, how-
ever, any of the proposed fully homomorphic encryption methods is very
costly and not suitable for many practical applications.
In this thesis, we use the Paillier cryptosystem (Section 3.1.2) as the
homomorphic encryption method.
3.2 PCPA-Secure Encryption
A symmetric encryption method is secure against chosen plaintext attacks if
the encrypted outputs (i.e., ciphertexts) do not reveal any useful information
on the unencrypted messages (i.e., plaintexts). Curtmola et al. [18] defines
a stronger security notion as pseudo-randomness against chosen plaintext
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attacks (PCPA), that guarantees the ciphertexts are indistinguishable from
random numbers. Formally, PCPA-security is defined as follows[18].
Definition 1. PCPA-security
Let two ciphertexts c0 and c1 are generated as follows:
c0 = Enc(msg)
c1 ∈R C,
where C denotes the ciphertext space.
A bit b is chosen at random, given msg and cb, adversary A guesses the
value of b as b′.
The encryption method is said to be PCPA-secure if for all polynomial-
size adversaries A,
Pr[b′ = b] ≤ 1
2
+ negl,
where negl is a negligible value.
PCPA-security satisfies a slightly stronger security compared to indis-
tinguishability against chosen-keyword attacks (IND2-CKA), introduced by
Goh [16]. While IND2-CKA provides indistinguishability between two ci-
phertexts, PCPA provides indistinguishability between a ciphertext and a
random number.
3.3 Hash Functions
In secure search concept, the search is applied on a secure index instead of the
actual documents, where the details are explained in the subsequent sections.
We utilize special hash functions to deduce a similarity between the secure
index entries of the sensitive data and an encrypted query. Each data item
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is represented by an entry in the secure index. The important property of
the secure index is that, it should be possible to compare two index elements
and estimate a distance between them without leaking any other information.
Although the exact similarity cannot be deduced, they still provide a good
approximation. Moreover, the accuracy of the similarity further increases as
hash functions with larger output size are used. We utilize the Hash-based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) and the MinHash functions in this
thesis.
3.3.1 Hash-based Message Authentication Code
In cryptography a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) [34] is
used for constructing a fix sized message authentication code utilizing a cryp-
tographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key. The cryptographic
strength of the HMAC depends upon the cryptographic strength of the un-
derlying hash function, the size of its hash output, and the size of the secret
key. In this thesis, we use SHA based HMAC functions for the HMAC based
secure search method.
3.3.2 MinHash
In the MinHash based method we proposed, a well-known technique, called
locality sensitive hashing [35] is used. Each document is represented by a
small set called signature. The important property of signatures is that, it
should be possible to compare two signatures and estimate a distance between
the underlying documents from the signatures alone. The signatures are
composed of several elements, each of which is constructed using the MinHash
functions. They provide close estimates and the larger the signatures the
more accurate the estimates.
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To MinHash a set, pick a permutation of the rows. The MinHash value is
the number of the first row in the permuted order, in which the corresponding
element is in the set. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 2. MinHash: Let ∆ be a finite set of elements, P be a permu-
tation on ∆ and P [i] be the ith element in the permutation P . MinHash of a
set D ⊆ ∆ under permutation P is defined as:
hP (D) = min({i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |∆| ∧ P [i] ∈ D})
In the proposed MinHash based method, for each signature, λ different
random permutations on ∆ are used so the final signature of a set D is:
Sig(D) = {hP1(D), . . . , hPλ(D)},
where hPj is the MinHash function under permutation Pj. We use the Min-
Hash signatures as an approximation method that maps the given items into
several buckets (λ) using different hash functions. The functions are chosen
such that while similar items are likely to be mapped into the same buckets,
dissimilar items are mapped to different buckets with high probability.
3.4 Distance Functions
A distance function is a metric used for describing the notion of closeness for
elements of some space. A distance function d, on a set X is a function
X ×X → R.
For all x, y, z ∈ X, this function is required to satisfy the following conditions:
1. d(x, y) ≥ 0 (non-negativity)
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2. d(x, y) = 0⇔ x = y (identity of indiscernibles)
3. d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry)
4. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality)
We use two well-known distance functions in this thesis.
3.4.1 Hamming Distance
The Hamming distance between two strings of equal length, is defined as
the number of symbols in which they differ [36]. Intuitively, it measures
the minimum number of substitutions required to change one string into the
other one.
In this thesis we use the Hamming distance on binary strings.
Example 1. Let x and y are “1011101” and “1001001” correspondingly.
Then the Hamming distance between x and y, d(“1011101”, “1001001”) = 2
3.4.2 Jaccard Distance
The Jaccard distance is a metric that measures the dissimilarity between two
sets. Intuitively, the Jaccard distance is the ratio of the number of different
elements in the two sets to the union.
Formally, the Jaccard distance between the sets A and B is defined as:
Jd(A,B) = 1− |A ∩B||A ∪B| (3.1)
=
|A ∪B| − |A ∩B|
|A ∪B| .
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3.5 Relevancy Score
In order to sort the matching results according to their relevancy with the
query, a similarity function is required. The similarity function assigns a
relevancy score to each of the matching results corresponding to a given
search query.
Four fundamental metrics are widely used in information systems for
calculating relevancy [37]:
• Term frequency(tfw,D) is defined as the number of times a keyword
w appears in a document D. Higher term frequency implies that the
document is more relevant to queries that contains the corresponding
keyword w.
• Inverse document frequency measures rarity of a keyword within
the database collection. Intuitively a keyword that is rare within the
database but common in a document results in a higher relevancy. The
inverse document frequency of a keyword w is obtained as:
idfw = log
( |D|
dfw
)
where |D| is the total number of document entries and dfw is document
frequency of w (i.e., total number of documents containing w).
• Document length (Density), results in a higher score for the shorter
of the two documents which contain equal number of keywords.
• Completeness results in a higher score for the documents that contain
more keywords.
A commonly used weighting factor for information retrieval is the tf-idf
weighting [37]. Intuitively, it measures the importance of a keyword within
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a document for a database collection. The weight of each keyword in each
document is calculated using the tf-idf weighting scheme that assigns a com-
posite weight using both term frequency (tf) and inverse document frequency
(idf) information. The tf-idf of a keyword w in a document D is given by:
tf-idfw,D = tfw,D × idfw.
Note that, the ratio inside the idf’s log function is always greater than or
equal to 1, hence, the value of idf is greater than or equal to 0. Consequently,
the resulting tf-idf is a real number greater than or equal to 0.
3.6 Success Rate
Two of the best metrics for analyzing the success of a search method are
the precision and recall metrics, which are widely used in the secure search
literature [20, 23, 38]. Let R(F ) be the set of items retrieved for a query with
feature set F and R∗(F ) be a subset of R(F ) such that, the elements of R∗(F )
include all the features in F . Further let D(F ) be the set of items in the data
set that contains all the features in F . Note that R∗(F ) ⊆ R(F ) and R∗(F ) ⊆
D(F ). Precision (prec(F )), recall (rec(F )), average precision (aprec(F )) and
average recall (arec(F )) for a set F = {F1, . . . , Fn} are defined as follows:
prec(F ) = |R
∗(F )|
|R(F )| , aprec(F) =
∑n
i=1
prec(Fi)
n
(3.2)
rec(F ) = |R
∗(F )|
|D(F )| , arec(F) =
∑n
i=1
rec(Fi)
n
(3.3)
The methods compare the expected and the actual results of the evaluated
system. Intuitively, precision measures the ratio of correctly found matches
over the total number of returned matches. Similarly recall measures the
ratio of correctly found matches over the total number of expected results.
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Chapter 4
HMAC-BASED SECURE
SEARCH METHOD
In this chapter, we propose an efficient system where any authorized user
can perform a search on an encrypted remote database with multiple key-
words, without revealing neither the queried keywords, nor the information
of the documents that match with the query. The only information that the
proposed scheme leaks is the access pattern which is also leaked by almost
all of the practical encrypted search schemes due to efficiency reasons.
Wang et al. [22] propose a trapdoorless private multi-keyword search
scheme that is proven to be secure under the random oracle model. The
scheme uses only binary comparison to test whether the secure index contains
the queried keywords, therefore, the search can be performed very efficiently.
However, there are some security issues that are not addressed in the work of
Wang et al. [22]. We adapt their indexing method to our scheme, but we use
a different encryption methodology to increase the security and address the
security issues that are not considered in [22]. While a preliminary version
of the work introduced in this chapter, is presented in the EDBT/ICDT
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conference [39], the full version of the work is published in the journal of
Distributed and Parallel Databases [40].
4.1 System and Privacy Requirements
The problem that we consider is privacy-preserving keyword search on public
storage system, where the documents are simply encrypted with the secret
keys unknown to the actual holder of the database (e.g., cloud server). We
consider three roles consistent with the previous works [23, 22]:
• Data Controller is the actual entity that is responsible for the estab-
lishment of the database. The data controller collects and/or generates
the information in the database and lacks the means (or is unwilling)
to maintain/operate the database.
• Users are the members in a group who are entitled to access (part of)
the information of the database.
• Server is a professional entity (e.g., cloud server) that offers information
services to authorized users. It is often required that the server be
oblivious to the content of the database it maintains, the search terms
in queries and the documents retrieved.
Let Di be a document in the sensitive database D, and Fi = {w1, . . . , wm}
be the set of features (i.e., keywords) that characterizes Di. Initially, the data
controller generates a searchable secure index I, using the feature sets of the
documents in D and sends I to the server. Given a query from the user,
the server applies search over I and returns a list of ordered items. Note
that this list does not contain any useful information to the third parties.
Upon receiving the list of ordered items, the user selects the most relevant
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data items and retrieves them. The details of the framework are presented
in Section 4.2.
The privacy definition for search methods in the related literature is that,
the server should not learn the searched terms [23]. We further tighten the
privacy over this general privacy definition and establish a set of privacy
requirements for privacy-preserving search protocols. A privacy preserving
multi-keyword search method should provide the following user and data
privacy properties (first intuitions and then formal definitions are given):
1. (Query Privacy) The query should not leak information of the corre-
sponding search terms it contains.
2. (Search Pattern Privacy) Equality between two search requests (i.e.,
queries) should not be verifiable by analyzing the queries or the re-
turned list of ordered matching results.
3. (Access Control) No one can impersonate a legitimate user.
4. (Adaptive Semantic Security) All the information that an adversary
can access, can be simulated using the information that is allowed to
leak. Hence, it is guaranteed that the only information leaks in the
proposed method, is the one that is is told to be leaked.
An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) if it uses random-
ness (i.e, flips coins) and its running time is bounded by some polynomial in
the input size or a polynomial in a security parameter. In cryptography, an
adversary’s advantage is a measure of how successfully it can attack a cryp-
tographic algorithm, by distinguishing it from an idealized version of that
type of algorithm.
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Definition 3. Query Privacy: A multi-keyword search protocol has query
privacy, if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A that, given two
different feature sets F0 and F1 and a query Qb generated from the feature
set Fb, where b ∈R {0, 1}, the advantage of A in finding b is negligible.
Definition 4. Access Control: A multi-keyword search protocol provides
access control, if there is no adversary A that can impersonate a legitimate
user with probability greater than , where  is the probability of breaking the
underlying signature scheme.
Definition 5. Search Pattern (Sp) is the frequency of the queries searched,
which is found by checking the equality between two queries. Formally, let
{Q1, . . . , Qn} be a set of queries and {F1, . . . , Fn} be the corresponding search
feature sets. Search pattern Sp is an n× n binary matrix, where
Sp(i, j) =
1, if Fi = Fj,0, otherwise
for i, j ≤ n.
Intuitively, any deterministic query generation method reveals the search
pattern.
Definition 6. Search Pattern Privacy: A multi-keyword search protocol
has search pattern privacy, if for all polynomial time adversaries A that,
given a query Q, a set of queries, Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} and the corresponding
match results that returns, the adversary cannot find the queries in Q that
are equivalent with Q.
Definition 7. Access Pattern (Ap) is the collection of data identifiers
that contains search results of a user query. Let Fi be the feature set of Qi
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and R(Fi) be the collection of identifiers of data elements that matches with
the feature set Fi, then Ap(Qi) = R(Fi).
Intuitively, if access pattern is leaked, given a query Q of a feature set
F , an attacker does not learn the content of F but learns which are the
documents in the data set that contains the features in F .
Definition 8. History (Hn): Let D be the collection of documents in the
data set and Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} be a collection of n queries. The n-query
history is defined as Hn(D,Q).
Definition 9. Trace (γ(Hn)): Let C = {C1, . . . , Cl} be the set of encrypted
user profiles, id(Ci) be the identifier of Ci and |Ci| be the size of Ci. Further-
more, let Dsig(Qi) be the digital signature of query Qi, |Dsig(Qi)| be the size
of Dsig(Qi), I be the searchable index and |I| be the number of all elements,
fake and genuine, in I.
The trace of Hn is defined as:
γ(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(Cl)), (|C1|, . . . , |Cl|), |Dsig(Q)|, |I|, Ap(Hn)}.
(4.1)
We allow to leak the trace to an adversary and guarantee no other infor-
mation is leaked.
Definition 10. View (v(Hn)) is the information that is accessible to an
adversary. Let Dsig(Q) be the list of digital signatures of queries in Q and,
id(Ci), C, Q and I are as defined above. The view of Hn is defined as:
v(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(Cl)), C, I,Q, Dsig(Q)}. (4.2)
Definition 11. Adaptive Semantic Security: [18]
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A cryptosystem is adaptive semantically secure, if for all probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms (PPTA), there exists a simulator S such that,
given the trace of a history Hn, S can simulate the view of Hn with probability
1− , where  is a negligible probability.
Intuitively, all the information accessible to an adversary (i.e., view (v(Hn)))
can be constructed from the trace (γ(Hn)) that is allowed to leak.
4.2 Framework of the HMAC-based Method
In this section, we provide the interactions between the three entities that
we consider: Data Controller, Users and Server, which are introduced in
Section 4.1. Due to the privacy concerns that are explained in Section 4.3.4,
we utilize two servers namely: search server and file server. The overview of
the proposed system is illustrated in Figure 4.1. We assume that the parties
are semi-honest (“honest but curious”) and do not collude with each other
to bypass the security measures; two assumptions which are consistent with
most of the previous work.
In Figure 4.1, steps and typical interactions between the participants of
the system are illustrated. In an off-line stage, the data controller creates a
search index element for each document. The searchable index file I is cre-
ated using a secret key based trapdoor generation function where the secret
keys1 are only known by the data controller. Then, the data controller up-
loads the searchable index file to the search server and the actual encrypted
documents to the file server. We use symmetric-key encryption as the encryp-
tion method since it can handle large document sizes efficiently. This process
is referred as the index generation henceforth and the trapdoor generation is
1More than one key can be used in trapdoors for the search terms.
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of the search method
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considered as one of its steps.
When a user wants to perform a search, he first connects to the data con-
troller. He learns the trapdoors (cf. Step 1 in Figure 4.1) for the keywords
(i.e., features) he wants to search for, without revealing the keyword infor-
mation to the data controller. Since the user can use the same trapdoor for
many queries containing the corresponding features, this operation does not
need to be performed every time the user performs a query. Alternatively,
the user can request all the trapdoors in advance and never connects again
to the data controller for the trapdoors. One of these two methods can be
selected depending on the application and the users’ requirements. After
learning the trapdoor information, the user generates the query (referred as
query generation henceforth) and submits it to the search server (cf. step 2 in
Figure 4.1). In return, he receives meta data2 for the matched documents in
a rank ordered manner as will be explained in subsequent sections. Then the
user retrieves the encrypted documents from the file server after analyzing
the meta data that basically conveys a relevancy level of the each matched
document, where the number of documents returned is specified by the user.
The proposed scheme satisfies the privacy requirements as defined in Sec-
tion 4.1 provided that the parameters are set accordingly. For an appropriate
setting of the parameters, the data controller needs to know only the frequen-
cies of the most commonly queried search terms for a given database. By
performing a worst case analysis for these search terms, the data controller
can estimate the effectiveness of an attack and take appropriate countermea-
sures. The necessary parameters and the methods for their optimal selections
are elaborated in the subsequent sections.
2Metadata does not contain useful information about the content of the matched doc-
uments.
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4.3 The HMAC-based Ranked Multi-Keyword
Search
In this section, we provide the details for the crucial steps in the proposed
HMAC-based secure search method, namely index generation, trapdoor gen-
eration, query generation and document retrieval.
4.3.1 Index Generation (basic scheme)
Recently Wang et al. [22] proposed a conjunctive keyword search scheme
that allows multiple-keyword search in a single query. We inspire from the
scheme in [22] and develop an index construction scheme with better privacy
properties.
The original scheme uses forward indexing, which means that a searchable
index file element for each document is maintained to indicate the search
terms existing in the document. In the scheme of Wang et al. [22], a secret
cryptographic hash function, that is shared between all authorized users, is
used to generate the searchable index. Using a single hash function shared
by several users forms a security risk since it can easily leak to the server.
Once the server learns the hash function, the security of the model can be
broken, if the input set is small. The following example illustrates a simple
attack against queries with few search terms.
Example 2. There are approximately 25000 commonly used words in En-
glish [41] and users usually search for a single or two keywords. For such
small input sets, given the hashed trapdoor for a query, it will be easy for the
server to identify the queried keywords by performing a brute-force attack.
For instance, assuming that there are approximately 25000 possible keywords
in a database and a query submitted by a user involves two keywords, there
29
will be 250002 < 228 possible keyword pairs. Therefore, approximately 227
trials will be sufficient to break the system and learn the queried keywords, if
the underlying trapdoor generation function is known.
We instead propose a trapdoor based system where the trapdoors can
only be generated by the data controller through the utilization of multiple
secret keys. The keywords are mapped to a secret key using a public mapping
function named GetBin which is defined in Section 4.3.2. The usage of secret
keys eliminates the feasibility of a brute force attack. The details of the
index generation algorithm which is adopted from [22] are explained in the
following and formalized in Algorithm 1.
Let D be the document collection where |D| = σ. While generating
the search index entry for a document D ∈ D that contains the keywords
{w1, . . . , wm}, we take HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) of
each keyword with the corresponding secret key Kid which produces an l = rd
bit output (HMAC: {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l). Let xi be the output of the HMAC
function for an input wi and the trapdoor of a keyword wi be denoted as Ii,
where Iji represents the j
th bit of Ii, (i.e., I
j
i ∈ GF (2), where GF stands for
Galois field [42]). The trapdoor of a keyword wi, Ii = (I
r−1
i , . . . , I
j
i , . . . , I
1
i , I
0
i )
is calculated as follows.
The l-bit output of HMAC, xi can be seen as an r-digit number in base-d,
where each digit is d bits. Also let xji ∈ GF (2d) denotes the jth digit of xi
and we can write
xi = x
r−1
i , . . . x
1
i , x
0
i .
After this, each r-digit output is reduced to r-bit output with the mapping
from GF (2d) to GF (2) as shown in Equation (4.3).
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Iji =
0, if x
j
i = 0,
1, otherwise.
(4.3)
As a last step in the index entry generation, the bit-wise product of trap-
doors of all keywords (Ii, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) in the document D is used to
obtain the final searchable index entry ID for the document D as shown in
Equation (4.4)
ID = mi=1Ii, (4.4)
where  is the bit-wise product operation. The resulting index entry ID is
an r-bit binary sequence and its jth bit is 1, if for all i, jth bit of Ii is 1, and
0 otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Index Generation
Require: D : the document collection,
Kid: secret key for the bin with label id
for all documents Di ∈ D do
for all keywords wij ∈ Di do
id← GetBin(wij)
xij ← HMACKid(wij)
Iij ← Reduce(xij)
end for
index entry IDi ← jIij
end for
return I = {ID1 , . . . , IDσ}
In the following section, we explain the technique used to generate queries
from the trapdoors of feature sets.
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4.3.2 Query Generation
The searchable index file of the database is generated by the data controller
using secret keys. A user who wants to include a search term in his query,
needs the corresponding trapdoor from the data controller since he does not
know the secret keys used in the index generation. Asking for the trapdoor
openly would violate the privacy of the user against the data controller,
therefore a technique is needed to hide the trapdoor asked by the user from
the data controller.
Bucketization is a well-known data partitioning technique that is fre-
quently used in the literature [43, 44, 45, 46]. We adopt this idea to distribute
keywords into a fixed number of bins depending on their hash values. More
precisely, every keyword is hashed by a public hash function, and certain
number of bits in the hash value is used to map the keywords into one of the
bins. The number of bins and the number of keywords in each bin can be
adjusted according to the security and efficiency requirements of the system.
In our proposal for obtaining trapdoors, we utilize a public hash function
with uniform distribution, named GetBin, that takes a keyword and returns
a value in {0, . . . , (δ − 1)} where δ is the number of bins. All the keywords
that exist in a document are mapped by the data controller to one of those
bins using the GetBin function. Note that, δ is smaller than the number
of keywords so that each bin contains several elements, which provides ob-
fuscation. The GetBin function has uniform distribution, therefore each bin
will have approximately equal number of items in it. Moreover, δ must be
chosen deliberately such that there are at least $ items in each bin where $
is a security parameter. Each bin in the index generation phase has a unique
secret key used for all keywords in that bin.
The query generation method, which is given in Algorithm 2, works as
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follows. When an authorized user connects to the data controller to obtain
the trapdoors for a set of keywords, he first calculates the bin IDs of the
keywords and sends these values to the data controller. The data controller
then returns the secret keys of the bins requested for, which can be used by
the user to generate the trapdoors3 for all keywords in those bins. Alterna-
tively, the data controller can send the trapdoors of all the keywords in the
corresponding bins resulting in an increase in the communication overhead.
However, the latter method relieves the user from computing the trapdoors.
Subsequent to obtaining the trapdoors, the user can calculate the query in
a similar manner to the method used by the data controller to compute the
searchable index. More precisely, if there are n keywords in a user query,
the following formula is used to calculate the privacy-preserving query, given
that the corresponding trapdoors (i.e., I1, . . . , In) are available to the user:
Q = nj=1Ij.
Finally, the user sends this r-bit query Q to the search server. The
users’ keywords are protected against disclosure since the secret keys used
in trapdoor generation are chosen by the data controller and never revealed
to the search server. In order to avoid impersonation, the user signs the
messages using a digital signature method.
4.3.3 Oblivious Search on the Database
A user’s query, in fact, is just an r-bit binary sequence (independent of
the number of search terms in it) and therefore, searching consists of as
simple operations as binary comparison only. If the search index entry of the
3In fact, Ii, which is calculated for the search term wi as explained in Section 4.3.1 is
the trapdoor for the keyword wi.
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Algorithm 2 Query Generation
Require: a set of query features F = {w′1, . . . , w′n}
for all w′i ∈ F do
id← GetBin(w′i)
if Kid /∈ previously received keys then
send id to Data Controller
get Kid from Data Controller
end if
xi ← HMACKid(w′i)
Ii ← Reduce(xi)
end for
query Q← i Ii
return Q
document (IR) has 0 for all the bits, for which the query (Q) has also 0, then
the query matches to that document as shown in Equation (4.5).
result(Q, IR) =
match, if ∀j Q
j = 0⇒ IjR = 0,
not match, otherwise.
(4.5)
Note that, the given query should be compared with the search index entry of
each document in the database. The following example clarifies the matching
process.
Example 3. Let the user’s query be Q = [011101] and two document index
entries be I1 = [001100] and I2 = [101101]. The query has the 0 bit in 0
th
and 4th bits therefore, those bits must be 0 in the index entry of a document
in order to be a match. Here the query matches with I1, but does not match
with I2 since 0
th bit of I2 is not 0.
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Subsequent to the search operation, the search server sends a rank ordered
list of meta data of the matching documents to the user, where the underlying
rank operation is explained in Section 4.6. The meta data is the search index
entry of that document, which the user can analyze further to learn more
about the relevancy of the document. After analyzing the meta data, the
user retrieves ciphertexts of the matching documents of his choice from the
file server.
To improve security, the data controller can change the HMAC keys pe-
riodically whereby each trapdoor will have an expiration time. After the
expiration, the user needs to get the new trapdoors for the keywords he
wants to use in his queries. This will alleviate the risk when the HMAC keys
are compromised.
4.3.4 Document Retrieval
The search server returns the list of pseudo identifiers of the matching doc-
uments. If a single server is used for both search and file retrieval, it can
be possible to correlate the pseudo identifiers of the matching documents
and the identifiers of the retrieved encrypted files. Furthermore, this may
also leak the search pattern that the proposed method hides. Therefore,
we use a two-server system similar to the one proposed in [20], where the
two servers are both semi-honest and do not collude. This method leaks
the access pattern only to the file server and not to the search server, hence
prevents any possible correlation between search results and encrypted doc-
uments retrieved.
Subsequent to the analyzes of the meta data retrieved from the search
server, the user requests a set of encrypted files from the file server. The file
server returns the requested encrypted files. Finally the user decrypts the files
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and learns the actual documents. The distribution of the document decryp-
tion keys can be performed using state-of-the-art key distribution methods
and is not within the scope of this thesis.
In case access pattern also needs to be hidden, Oblivious RAM [47, 27]
methods can be utilized for the document retrieval process instead. However,
these methods are too expensive to be practical even on medium sized data-
sets, due to incurred polylogarithmic overhead.
4.4 Query Randomization
Search pattern is the information of equality among the keywords of two
queries that can be inferred by linking one query to another. If an adversary
can test the equality among two queries, he may learn the most frequent
queries and correlate with the frequently searched real keywords that may
be learned from statistics such as Google Trends [48]. The proposed basic
scheme fails to hide the search pattern since the search index entries are
generated in a deterministic way. Any two query generated from the identical
feature sets, will be exactly the same. In order to hide the search pattern of a
user, we introduce randomness into the query generation phase. This process
is known as query randomization, which should be carefully implemented so
that the queries do not leak information about the search patterns. In this
section, we analytically demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed query
randomization method. Note that, the query randomization does not change
the response to a given query.
For introducing non-determinacy into the search index generation, we
generate a set U with |U| = U , whereby the elements of U are dummy
keywords that do not exist in the dictionary (i.e., they are simply random
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strings). The U dummy keywords are added in every index entry along with
the genuine keywords. While generating a query, the user first randomly
creates a set V where |V| = V and V ⊂ U . Then the query is composed using
all elements of V together with the genuine search terms. The number of
different choices of V from U is calculated as CUV , where Cnk is the number of
k-combinations from a set with n elements.
We can formalize the discussion as follows. Let
Qi = {Qi1, Qi2, . . . , Qiµ}
be the set of queries that are generated from the same search features using
different dummy keywords. Furthermore, let Qx be the set of all possible
other queries. Given two queries Qi ∈ Qi and Qj, identifying whether Qj ∈
Qi or Qj ∈ Qx must be hard.
We use the Hamming distance metric for evaluating the similarity of two
queries, which is defined in Section 3.4.1. We define two new functions to
analytically calculate the expected Hamming distance.
Definition 12. Scarcity Function (F (x)) The scarcity function F (x) is
the expected number of 0’s in a query, where x is the number of keywords.
Definition 13. Overlap Function (C(x)) The overlap function C(x) is
the expected number of 0’s that coincide in the corresponding bit positions of
an x keyword query (Qa) and a single keyword query (Qb).
Recall that r is the size of a query, d is the reduction value (cf. Sec-
tion 4.3.1) and Q[i] is the ith bit of Q. The functions are calculated as
follows:
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Proposition 1. For the Scarcity and Overlap functions we can write,
F (x) = F (x− 1) + F (1)− C(x− 1)
C(x) =
r−1∑
i=0
P (Qa[i] = 0, Qb[i] = 0),
where P (a, b) is a joint probability distribution.
Note that, the initial case for F (x) is F (1) =
r
2d
and C(x) is calculated
as follows:
C(x) =
r−1∑
i=0
P (Qa[i] = 0, Qb[i] = 0)
= r
F (x)
r
F (1)
r
=
F (x)
2d
.
The expected Hamming distance between two queries (i.e., Q1 and Q2)
with x keywords each, where they have x¯ ≤ x common keywords, is calculated
as in the following.
Proposition 2. The Expected Hamming distance between two queries with
x¯ common keywords, can be calculated as follows:
∆ (Q1, Q2) =
(F (x)− F (x¯)) (r − F (x))
r
+
F (x)(r − F (x))
r
.
This can be seen by the simple derivation:
∆ (Q1, Q2) =
r−1∑
i=0
P (Q1[i] 6= Q2[i])
= r · P (Q1[1] 6= Q2[1])
= r · [P (Q1[1] = 0)P (Q2[1] = 1|Q1[1] = 0) + P (Q1[1] = 1)P (Q2[1] = 0|Q1[1] = 1)]
= r ·
[
F (x)
r
(
F (x¯)
F (x)
· 0 + F (x)− F (x¯)
F (x)
· r − F (x)
r
)
+
r − F (x)
r
(
F (x)
r
)]
=
(F (x)− F (x¯)) (r − F (x))
r
+
F (x)(r − F (x))
r
,
(4.6)
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where P (A|B) is the conditional probability of A given B.
Each query chooses V keywords out of U dummy keywords. While com-
paring two arbitrary queries, the expected number of dummy keywords that
exists in the both queries (EO) is calculated as in the following.
Proposition 3. The expected number of dummy keywords that both queries
contain can be calculated as follows:
EO (V ) =
V∑
i=0
(
V
i
)(
U − V
V − i
)
(
U
V
) i. (4.7)
The first query chooses V keywords. The probability that i (i ≤ V )
keywords that is chosen by the second query also exist in the first one, is
calculated as follows: i keywords are chosen from the set of keywords that
are also selected by the first query and (V − i) keywords are chosen from
the set of not-selected keywords. Then we use summation to calculate the
expected value in (Equation (4.7)). Note that, EO(V ) is a monotonically
increasing function (i.e., V ≥ V ′ ⇔ EO(V ) ≥ EO(V ′)).
A possible way of choosing an optimum parameter setting is shown in the
following example.
Example 4. We use 448 bits as the query size (r) and the largest U for
this query size that provides sufficient accuracy (i.e., high precision rate; cf.
Section 4.4.4) is found as 60. Any further increase in U necessitates increas-
ing the query size, which causes an increase in communication, computation
and storage requirements (cf. Section 4.8). Using the formulae in (Equa-
tion (4.6) and (4.7)), the normalized differences between ∆(Qi, Qj) for two
arbitrary queries {Qi, Qj} and ∆(Qiα, Qiβ), where {Qiα, Qiβ} ∈ Qi are given
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in Figure 4.2. The normalized difference is calculated using the equation,
∆(Qi, Qj)−∆(Qiα, Qiβ)
∆(Qi, Qj)
.
One can observe from Figure 4.2 that, when U is fixed as 60, V = 30 is
the smallest value, which ensures that the distance between the two queries
Qi ∈ Qi and Qj /∈ Qi is sufficiently close to the distance between Qiα ∈ Qi
and Qiβ ∈ Qi. Note that, any V ≥ 30 can also be used. The parameter
setting that we used in our tests, is discussed more formally in Section 4.8.
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Figure 4.2: Normalized difference of the Hamming Distances between two
arbitrary queries and two queries with the same genuine search features,
where U = 60.
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of our analysis, we conducted an
experiment using synthetic query data for the case, where adversary does not
know the number of genuine search terms in a query. We generate a synthetic
data set for a set of queries with the parameters V = 30 and U = 60 being
fixed. The set contains a total of 250 queries, where the first 50 queries
contain 2 genuine search terms each, the second 50 queries contain 3 genuine
search terms each, and so on. And finally, the last set of 50 queries contains
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6 genuine search terms each. We create another set that contains only 5
queries, which includes 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 genuine search terms, respectively.
The distances between pairs of queries, in which one query is chosen from
the former set and the second one from the latter, are measured to obtain a
histogram as shown in Figure 4.3(a). Consequently, a total of 250×5 = 1250
distances are measured. We also obtain another histogram featuring a total of
1250 distances between pairs of queries, whereby queries in a pair contain the
same genuine search terms with different dummy keywords. Both histograms
are given in Figure 4.3(a), where it can be observed that adversary cannot
do better than a random guess to identify whether given two queries contain
the same genuine search terms or not.
We also conduct a similar experiment, in which we assume that the ad-
versary has the knowledge of the number of search terms in a query. A
set containing a total of 1000 queries is generated, whose subsets with 200
queries each contain 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 genuine search terms, respectively. A
single query is then created using 5 genuine search terms. We measure the
distances of the single query to all 1000 queries in the former set of queries and
create the corresponding histogram (i.e., a total of 200× 5 = 1000 distances
are measured). We compared this with the histogram for 1000 measurements
of the distance between two queries with five identical search terms as shown
in Figure 4.3(b). As can be observed from the histogram in Figure 4.3(b),
20% of the time, distances between two queries are 150 and they are totally
indistinguishable. In 45% of the time, the distances are smaller than 150,
where the adversary can guess Qj ∈ Qi with 0.6 confidence. In 35% of the
time, the distances are greater than 150 and the adversary can guess Qj /∈ Qi
with 0.7 confidence. In accordance with these results, one can guess whether
the queries are from the same search terms or not correctly with 0.6 confi-
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dence under the assumption that the number of genuine search terms in the
query is known to be 5. The tests with different number of genuine search
terms also provide analogous results, where the confidence of distinguishing
equivalent queries increase as the number of genuine search terms increase.
This observation is in parallel with the expectation. As the number of gen-
uine search terms in a query increase, the number of terms that are identical
for the equivalent queries also increase, which make them vulnerable for such
attacks.
Hence, the information of the number of genuine search terms should be
kept secret, which is the case in our proposed method.
4.4.1 Correlation Attack
It is possible that the attacker may have some prior knowledge on the statis-
tical model of the search terms in the queries (e.g., search frequency of the
most frequently queried search terms). In this case, the attacker may use
this information to deduce a set of queries that all include a search term w.
Then, the trapdoor for w may be revealed with some error, provided that the
adversary obtains a sufficient number of queries that all features the search
term w. In this section, the proposed method is analyzed against this attack
that is referred as correlation attack. Note that the wisest choice of w for the
adversary to attack, will be the most commonly used search term which has
the highest occurrence rate in the previous queries. The adversary may have
prior knowledge of the most frequently queried search terms or may guess
using the public statistics such as [48].
In order to analyze whether the attacker can identify a group of equivalent
queries from other queries, we define a Distinguisher function H(Ak, Qk+1).
This function takes two parameters; a set Ak = {Q1, . . . , Qk} with k queries
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Figure 4.3: Histograms for the Hamming distances between queries
and a single query Qk+1, and returns the number of 0’s that coincides with
all elements of the set Ak and Qk+1 (i.e., the number of query bit positions
where all k+ 1 queries has 0 in that bit position). Let Qk+1 have xk+1 search
terms, where x¯ of them are common with all the queries in Ak. The expected
number of common 0 bits is estimated with the distinguisher function which
is defined as follows.
Definition 14. (Distinguisher Function) The distinguisher function, H(Ak, Qk+1),
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is the number of bits with value 0, that coincide in the corresponding bit po-
sitions of each element of the set Ak and the query Qk+1.
Proposition 4. Expected Value of Distinguisher Function can recursively be
estimated as:
H(Ak, Qk+1) =

F (x¯) +
(F (x1)− F (x¯))(F (x2)− F (x¯))
r
if k = 1
F (x¯) +
(H(Ak−1, Qk)− F (x¯))(F (xk+1)− F (x¯))
r
otherwise.
(4.8)
Let a search term w be an element of all the queries in Ak and further
let w ∈ Qk+1 and w /∈ Q′k+1. Using the distinguisher function in equation
(4.8), we define a dissimilarity function Ω(Ak, Qk+1, Q′k+1), that compares
the dissimilarity between Qk+1 and Q
′
k+1 as in the following.
Definition 15. (Dissimilarity Function)
Ω(Ak, Qk+1, Q′k+1) =
|H(Ak, Qk+1)−H(Ak, Q′k+1)|
H(Ak, Qk+1) (4.9)
If Ω(Ak, Qk+1, Q′k+1) ≤ z, where z is a sufficiently small security param-
eter, we say that distinguishing the set of queries that all contain the same
keyword w from the other queries, is hard.
The Dissimilarity function is analyzed for various values of inputs in order
to find the optimum choice for the parameters of randomness (i.e. U, V ) that
minimize Ω(Ak, Qk+1, Q′k+1) given in equation (4.9). We present the results
in Figure 4.4.
Figures 4.4(a), 4.4(b), and 4.4(c) indicate that for a fixed value of U ,
increasing V decreases the dissimilarity of queries when compared with the
set Ak. In other words, it will be difficult to distinguish queries that possess
w from those that do not. Note that, since V is introduced for obfuscating the
queries, increasing V also increases the similarity between unrelated queries
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Figure 4.4: Values of Dissimilarity Function (Equation (4.9)) for different
parameters
as expected. However, increasing V also increase the probability that two
equivalent queries pick exactly the same set of dummy terms which reveal
they are equivalent. Hence, choosing the value of V slightly larger than U/2
provides an optimum choice. Another issue that can be observed from the
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figures is that, increasing U , which enables larger values for V , also decreases
the dissimilarity of queries.
Let the adversary be able to access all the search history (i.e., all previous
queries from all users). If the adversary can find k queries that all feature an
arbitrary search term w, where the dissimilarity function Ω(Ak, Qk+1, Q′k+1)
is greater than z for that k, then the adversary can identify with a high
confidence level that all that k queries include the same search term and
may learn the trapdoor of the search term w with a small error. Therefore,
the probability of finding such k queries should be negligible.
We provide an example using the Reuters news dataset [49] that shows the
difficulty of finding a trapdoor of a search term. Without loss of generality,
we assume the adversary tries to find the trapdoor of the most commonly
queried search term.
Example 5. In large databases, the occurrence frequencies of the real key-
words are considerably small. For instance, in the Reuters dataset we use,
after the stop words are removed, the most frequent keyword occurs in only
7% of all the documents in the dataset. We assume that the same statistics
apply to the real search patterns, which implies one keyword w can occur at
most 7% of all the queries.
Let there be 1000 queries in the history Hn, where 70 of them are expected
to feature the keyword w. The probability of finding such k queries where the
most frequent keyword occurs in p% of the queries in a database of n queries,
is
C
np/100
k
Cnk
,
which is approximately 2−19 for k = 5, 2−39 for k = 10, 2−60 for k = 15 and
2−81 for k = 20 in a database, where n = 1000 and p = 7. In other words,
when k = 20, adversary has to try 281 combinations of queries to find a
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correct set. Note that increasing n has a very minimal effect on the calculated
probability. For practical purposes, k > 15 satisfies sufficient security level,
which implies that it is not feasible to find k queries that all feature the
same keyword. The attacker may find queries featuring the same keyword
for smaller values of k, but this time identifying whether they all include the
same search term or not will be hard, as shown in the following section.
4.4.2 Experiments on Correlation Attack
In order to demonstrate that our analyses are valid, we conducted experi-
ments using synthetic data. Given a set of queries, we want to analyze the
probability of identifying whether all the set elements contain a common gen-
uine search term or not. We generate histograms that compare the number
of 0’s coinciding in two sets of queries. All queries in both sets have k gen-
uine and V dummy search terms. While the first set has a common genuine
search term w that exists in all the queries, the second set does not have
any common genuine search term. We further compute the confidence levels
indicating the reliability of the guess. While a confidence level of 0.5 means
that one cannot do better than a random guess out of the two sets, a confi-
dence level of 1.0 means that one can certainly identify the correct set from
the given two sets. For the case where U = 60 and V = 40, the histograms
that compare the number of coinciding 0’s for a set of k queries are given in
Figure 4.5. In Table 4.1 we enumerate the confidence levels calculated from
the histograms.
We want the confidence level of the attacker to be less than 0.6. Our
experiments indicate that, setting the security threshold z for the dissimi-
larity function Ω (equation (4.9)), as z = 0.4 gives sufficient level of obfus-
cation that satisfies the required low confidence level. From Figure 4.4 that
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Figure 4.5: Histograms that compare the number of 0’s coinciding in k queries
with a common search term and those with no common search term where
U=60 and V=40
shows the dissimilarity values for different U and V values, the candidates
that satisfy the required security level are found as, {U = 50, V = 40},
{U = 60, V = 40} and {U = 80, V = 55}.
4.4.3 Hiding Dummy Elements
During the query randomization process, we add U ∈ U dummy keywords in
all the entries in the index. Similar to the genuine keywords, those dummy
keywords are processed with the HMAC and Reduce functions following the
steps of Algorithm 1, which eventually maps some of the d-bit digits to single
0 bits. Since these U dummy keywords exist in all the entries, the bits that
are assigned by those keywords are 0 in all the index entries IRi ∈ I. If the
adversary has access to the searchable index file (e.g., cloud service provider),
he can trivially identify bits set by dummy keywords by just marking bits
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k Confidence level
5 0,55
10 0,57
15 0,59
20 0,67
Table 4.1: Confidence levels of identifying queries featuring the same search
term
that are 0 in all the index entries.
In order to hide those bits set by the dummy keywords, we add fake
index entries, where their bits are deliberately set. The adversary cannot
distinguish the bits that are set by genuine keywords, from the bits set by
dummy keywords, if the distributions of the number of 0’s are equivalent in
both cases. Figure 4.6 shows the number of 0’s in each bit location for the
cases;
1. only genuine search terms (cf. Figure 4.6(a)),
2. after adding U dummy keywords (cf. Figure 4.6(b)),
3. after the addition of fake index entries (cf. Figure 4.6(c)).
Figure 4.6 indicates that prior to the addition of fake elements (cf. Fig-
ure 4.6(b)), the bits set by the dummy keywords are obvious, since all the
index entries contain the 0 bit in the same bit locations. However, after the
addition of fake entries (cf. Figure 4.6(c)), they become indistinguishable
from the other bits. The number of fake entries is chosen to be equal to
the number of genuine entries leading to doubling index size. However, since
size of an index entry is very small (constant r bits) this is not a burden
for the cloud server. Note that, the additional fake entries do not have any
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effect on the number of false positives (i.e., false accept rates) and hence,
precision of the method is not affected. Although, the search time increases
due to the increased number of index entries, the increase in search time is
not significant due to the fact that it can be performed very efficiently in a
parallel fashion.
(a) before addition of dummy keywords (b) with dummy keywords
(c) after addition of fake index entries
Figure 4.6: Number of 0’s in each bit location for 500 genuine and 500 fake
entries (for (c))
The search server may have access to excessive number of search results
from various users. Utilizing the search results, the server can identify some of
the fake entries with high confidence via analysis of the number of matches
with each index entry. Note that the expected number of matches with
fake index entries is smaller than the genuine index entries. We propose
two methods to prevent the correlation of fake index entries. Firstly, the
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data controller can change the HMAC keys and the pseudo identifiers of
index entries periodically. This will alleviate the risk by limiting the search
server’s access to search results. Alternatively, a trusted proxy can be utilized
to occasionally send fake queries that match with the fake index entries. If
number of matches of the fake index entries has a similar distribution with
the genuine index entries, then fake index entries are indistinguishable from
the genuine index entries.
4.4.4 Success Rates
The indexing method that we employ includes all the information on search
terms in a single r-bit index file per document. Despite the fact that the
hash function employed in the implementations is collision-free, after the
reduction and bitwise product operations there is a possibility that index of
a query may wrongly match with an irrelevant document, which is called as
a false positive (i.e., false accept).
As defined in Section 3.6, the success of a secure search method is mea-
sured with precision and recall metrics. The recall of the proposed HMAC
based scheme is always one, which means that if a document contains all the
queried features, then it will definitely be a match with the query. Although
all matching documents can be identified by the method, there may also be
some false positives, which affects the precision.
Let m be the number of genuine features in a document. In Figure 4.7,
precision is measured for queries with 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 search terms for index
size r = 448 bits and U = 60, whereby in Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b) each
document in the database has 30 and 40 genuine features (i.e., m = 30
and m = 40), respectively. When the number of genuine search terms in a
query is small ( 3 or less ), the noise in the query is limited, which results in
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(a) number of genuine search terms per doc is 30
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(b) number of genuine search terms per doc is 40
Figure 4.7: Effect of V in precision rate, where U = 60
almost no false positives (fp), hence precision rates are very close to 1. When
the number of search terms is higher (4 or more), the number of matching
documents gets very small. As the number of matching documents is small,
the effect of the false positive matches is higher on the precision.
Figure 4.7 also indicates that an increase in the number of search terms in
documents (m) also decreases precision. Note that precision decreases from
Figure 4.7(a) to Figure 4.7(b) as m increases from 30 to 40. This is a result
of the increase in the number of 0’s in the index entries of the documents.
If larger number of keywords is required for a document, a longer HMAC
function can be used with a larger reduction parameter d. Recall that, as
shown in Equation (4.3) in Section 4.3.1, reduction maps a d-bit digit to a
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single bit where output is 0, with probability 1/2d and 1, with probability
1−1/2d. Therefore, the ratio of the number of zeros in an index entry with m
genuine and U dummy keywords, with respect to index size, can be estimated
as m+U
2d
. Similarly each keyword is approximately represented with r
2d
zero
bits in an index entry. If d gets larger and r is kept constant, the number
of zeros in the index decreases, which may cause some keywords being not
represented in the index. Provided that the ratios m+U
2d
and r
2d
do not change,
the precision will expectedly remain constant. If the number of genuine
keywords in a document (m) doubles, the number of dummy keywords (U)
also doubles and d is incremented by 1 to keep the ratio of m+U
2d
constant.
Due to the increase in d, r is also doubled to keep r
2d
constant. In Figure 4.8,
we present the required output sizes for the HMAC functions (l) and the
index entries (r) with respect to the total number of keywords (genuine and
dummy) in documents such that, minimum precision does not fall behind
75%.
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Figure 4.8: Effect of increase in the total number of keywords (m + U) per
document on HMAC size (l) and index entry size (r)
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Figure 4.8 indicates that the increase in the index entry size, r, is quite
limited and the proposed method can still be efficiently applied for large
number of keywords per document. Although the usage of longer HMAC
functions increases the cost of the index generation, since the increase in the
index size, r, is limited, the communication cost, storage requirements and
search time will remain at acceptable levels, without affecting the overall
efficiency of the proposed scheme. Optimized value for the index size should
be determined considering the requirements of the applications.
Increasing the level of obfuscation (i.e., addition of more dummy key-
words) increases the security of the method against an adversary trying to
identify queries that feature the same genuine search term. Nevertheless, this
will also decrease precision rate. The results presented in Figure 4.9 compare
the precision rates of the three settings found in Section 4.4.2 that satisfy
the security requirements.
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Figure 4.9: Precision comparison, where number of genuine search terms per
document is m = 40
Figure 4.9 indicates that the precision decrease with the number of dummy
keywords (U) added. While precision for U ≤ 60 are acceptable, the preci-
sion for U = 80 is not suitable for various applications since it immediately
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incurs additional communication cost.
For a fixed U , the level of obfuscation increases as V gets larger (Fig-
ure 4.4), however precision decreases with the increase of V (Figure 4.7).
Therefore, we use the smallest V that satisfies sufficient obfuscation (i.e.,
satisfy Ω(Ak, Qk+1, Q′k+1) < z) as the optimum choice for V .
Given two queries with the same genuine search terms, the probability
of having exactly the same set of dummy keywords must be very small.
Otherwise the generated queries may be exactly the same, which leaks the
information that the genuine search terms for the both queries are the same.
This probability is
(
CUV
)−1
, which is minimized if U = 2V . For the two
parameter settings that satisfy both high precision and sufficient obfusca-
tion, the probability of having the same set of dummy keywords is 2−52 for
U = 60, V = 40 and it is 2−33 for U = 50, V = 40. Hence, the optimum
parameters, for the data set we consider, are set as U = 60, V = 40. Note
that the number of genuine keywords in each document is set as m = 40 in
the experiments. Utilizing these tests on the Reuters data set [49], we can
generalize an optimum setting for U , V and m in the corresponding data set,
as follows:
m
U
=
2
3
&
V
U
=
2
3
.
4.5 Hiding Response Pattern
In the previous section, it is demonstrated that, linking queries that feature
the same genuine search terms is not feasible, provided that the random-
ization parameters (i.e. U and V ) are set appropriately. However, if the
attacker has access to the database, (e.g., the cloud service provider) it may
be possible to correlate queries with the same search terms since the list
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of matching results will be almost the same except for some false positives.
Note that different queries can match with the same index entries due to
different keywords in those documents. Nevertheless, if the list of matching
documents is the same, then the attacker can guess with a high confidence
that the queries are also the same. Similar to the randomization method
we use in Section 4.4.3, we propose to add some fake index entries4 to the
database such that the lists of matching documents for the two queries with
the same genuine search terms will be different.
In the basic scheme given in Section 4.3, in addition to the genuine key-
words, index entry of each document possesses U random dummy strings,
where random V of them are added to each query index. In the modified
method, similar to the real documents, the fake entries include both genuine
search terms and dummy strings. The genuine search terms are placed in
the fake entries according to the distribution in the real data set, but with
a constant factor more frequent. We define a frequency enhancer constant c
as in the following.
Definition 16. (Frequency Enhancer (c)) Fake entries in the index file in-
clude genuine search terms more frequently than real documents with a factor
of c (i.e., frequency enhancer).
Intuitively, if a genuine search term w occurs in p% of the real documents
in the database, it also occurs in c · p% of the fake entries.
While the dummy strings are chosen with uniform distribution from the
set U , the number of dummy strings selected for a fake entry, which we denote
as V ′, must be carefully set. The subsequent sections provide the analysis
on as to how the values of V ′ and c are set.
4Users, but not the server, can identify the fake index entries. Since there is no docu-
ment corresponding to fake entries, they will be discarded by the user.
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Note that, the fake entries that are added for hiding the response pattern
are generated in a different way from the ones we use for hiding positions
of dummy keywords in Section 4.4.3. The fake entries generated in this
section (i.e., Section 4.5) include both genuine search terms and dummy
strings hence, can match with queries. However, the fake entries generated
in Section 4.4.3 do not possess the dummy keywords and cannot match with
the queries.
4.5.1 Analysis on Selecting Number of Fake Entries
Note that, the search index entry of each genuine document contains all the
U dummy strings, while the queries have only V out of those U strings. Let
the fake document entries possess the dummy strings in a set V ′ ⊆ U , where
|V ′| = V ′. In order to match a query with a fake document entry, all the
genuine search terms and the dummy strings in the query should also exist
in that fake document entry which implies, V should be smaller than V ′. If
V ′ = U as in the real document index entries, the lists of matching index
entries of documents for two queries with same genuine search terms would be
identical, a case which we want to avoid. Hence, the inequality, V < V ′ < U ,
must be satisfied. Small V ′ reduces the number of fake document entries that
match with a query. However, it increases the probability that the sets of
matching fake entries to queries with same genuine search terms are different.
Given a query and a fake entry that possesses all the genuine search terms
of that query, we denote the probability that the query matches with the fake
entry as pF , where the definition is as follows.
pF =
U−V ′−1∏
i=0
U − V − i
U − i . (4.10)
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In Section 4.4.1, we show that an optimal choice for the parameters of
dummy strings in our setting is U = 60 and V = 40. In Figure 4.10, we plot
the values of pF with respect to V
′, while U and V are fixed. The figure
shows that, for values of V ′ ≤ 57, pF is very low, which drastically reduces
the number of fake matches and thus decreases obfuscation. Therefore, the
only two possible choices of V ′ for the setting used, are 58 and 59. This can
also be generalized as V ′ should be chosen as very close but smaller than U .
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Figure 4.10: pF values with respect to V
′, where U = 60 and V = 40
The security of the system is analyzed in the following section.
4.5.2 Correlating Match Results
Given a query, the number of matching fake document entries should be
larger than the number of matching real documents. Otherwise, correlating
two queries with the same genuine search terms can be possible. Let σ be
the number of real documents in the database, we add q · σ fake entries to
the index file. Also let f be the fake match enhancer such that if a query
matches to a real document with probability p, it matches with a fake entry
with probability f ·p, which is calculated as f = c·p·pF , where pF is as defined
in Equation (4.10) and c is the frequency enhancer as defined in Section 4.5.
Then, the number of matching fake document entries will approximately be
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f · σ. While this method increases the storage requirement for the database
index by a factor of q, since the index entry size is very small (constant
r bits) this is not a burden for the cloud server. Nevertheless, search and
index generation times also increase with a factor of q, therefore q needs to
be minimized. We set q = 1 and increase c to satisfy c · q · pF = f .
The server can correlate two queries with the same genuine search terms
if the number of index entries that the both queries match, is significantly
larger than the average number of entries that any two arbitrary queries
both match. We provide a theoretical analysis on the number of common
matching entries for a given pair of queries. Note that there are three ways
a document index entry can match to a query:
1. A real document entry can match if the document possesses all the
genuine search terms in the query,
2. A real document entry can falsely as a false positive,
3. A fake document entry can match if the fake document entry possesses
all the genuine search terms and dummy strings in the query.
Let x be the number of genuine search terms in the query and pi is the
frequency of the ith search term in the database, assuming that the occur-
rences of search terms in a document are independent events, the expected
number of index entries that match from case 1 (E(M1)) is:
E(M1) = σ
x∏
i=1
pi
Let FPx be the false positive rate of a query containing x genuine search
terms and q be the multiplicative factor for the number of fake index entries
as defined in this section. Then, the expected number of index entries that
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match from case 2 (E(M2)) is:
E(M2) = FPx · (q + 1)σ
Let pF be as defined in Equation (4.10), the expected number of index
entries that match from case 3 (E(M3)) is:
E(M3) = c q σ pF
x∏
i=1
pi = f σ
x∏
i=1
pi
E(M1) is the expected number of true positive matches while E(M2) and
E(M3) are the expected numbers of false positives (accidental and intentional
respectively). Therefore, we denote E(M1) as E(T
+) and E(M2) + E(M3)
as E(F+).
The expected total number of index entries that match to a query with
x genuine search terms (E(M)) is:
E(M) = E(T+) + E(F+)
Note that, E(T+) <
E(F+)
f
and E(M2) is reasonably small due to the small
false accept rates given in Figure 4.9. This implies that
E(M) ≤ (f + 1)E(T+). (4.11)
Given two arbitrary queries Q and Q′, the expected number of common
index entries that both queries match, denoted as E(Carb), is estimated as:
E(Carb) =
E(T+Q )
σ
E(T+Q′)
σ
σ +
E(F+Q )
q σ
E(F+Q′)
q σ
q σ
≈ E(T
+
Q )E(T
+
Q′)
σ
+
f 2E(T+Q )E(T
+
Q′)
q σ
. (4.12)
Given two queries Q and Q′ that have the same genuine search terms,
the expected number of common index entries that both queries match, is
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estimated as:
E(Csame) = E(T
+) +
E(F+Q )
q σ
E(F+Q′)
q σ
q σ
≈ E(T+) + f
2E(T+)2
q σ
(4.13)
We assume that the two queries have equal number of search terms in the
queries compared (i.e., they have similar number of index entries matched)
and therefore, E(T+Q ) ≈ E(T+Q′). Otherwise, they can easily be identified
as different queries. We define an identifiability function S(Q1, Q′1, Q2) that
takes three queries where Q1 and Q
′
1 have the same genuine search terms and
Q2 is an arbitrary query and returns a value indicating the identifiability of
Q2 from Q1.
Definition 17. (Identifiability Function)
S(Q1, Q′1, Q2) =
E(Csame)− E(Carb)
E(Csame)
The identifiability function can be calculated as:
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S(Q1, Q′1, Q2) =
E(Csame)− E(Carb)
E(Csame)
=
(
E(T+) +
f 2E(T+)2
q σ
)
−
(
E(T+Q )E(T
+
Q′)
σ
+
f 2E(T+Q )E(T
+
Q′)
q σ
)
(
E(T+) +
f 2E(T+)2
q σ
)
=
E(T+)− E(T
+)2
σ(
E(T+) +
f 2E(T+)2
q σ
)
=
1− E(T
+)
σ(
1 +
f 2E(T+)
q σ
)
=
1− σ
∏x
i=1 pi
σ(
1 +
f 2 σ
∏x
i=1 pi
q σ
)
=
1−∏xi=1 pi(
1 +
f 2
∏x
i=1 pi
q
)
=
1−∏xi=1 pi
(1 + f 2
∏x
i=1 pi)
since we set q = 1 (4.14)
If we have the following inequality,
S(Q1, Q′1, Q2) ≤ ˇ
where ˇ is a security threshold, we say that the attacker cannot identify
whether two queries are from same search terms or not, from the informa-
tion of matching index entry ids. Note that f and S(Q1, Q′1, Q2) are inversely
proportional and therefore, we set f as large as possible by adjusting param-
eters q and c.
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4.5.3 Experimental Results
We conducted tests on the real data set [49] of 30, 000 database index entries
(10,000 real, 10,000 fake from Section 4.4.3 and 10,000 fake from Section 4.5)
to demonstrate the success in hiding the response patterns. We randomly
generate four groups of genuine search term sets which contain from 2 up to
5 search terms. Each group has 200 elements with total of 800 sets of search
terms. For each search term set, we generate 2 queries (i.e., same genuine
search terms with different dummy keywords) and measure the similarity
between the sets of matching index entry ids. Similarly we also generate
another test group. This time, we apply 200 tests for each group by generat-
ing two different queries within the same group and measure the similarity
between the sets of matching index entry ids. The results are illustrated in
Figure ?? where U = 60, V = 40 and V ′ = 59. In order to decrease c, we use
the largest possible V ′ which is U − 1. Note that although higher f implies
lower identifiability which is desirable, increasing f necessitates increasing c,
which also increases number of genuine search terms in fake index entries.
In our tests we set f = 5, which is the largest f that keeps the number
of keywords in fake index entries the same as the number of keywords in
genuine index entries. Note that the proposed method also provides search
with single term, however we applied multiple terms in our experiments to
emphasize the multi-keyword search property of the proposed method and
the privacy issues in this setting.
4.6 Ranked Search
The multi-keyword search method, explained in Section 4.3, checks whether
queried keywords exist in an index entry or not. If the user searches for
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a single or a few keywords, there will possibly be many correct matches,
where some of them may not be useful for the user at all. Therefore, it is
difficult to decide as to which documents are the most relevant. We add
ranking capability to the system by adding extra index entries for frequently
occurring keywords in a document. With ranking, the user can retrieve only
the top τ matches where τ is chosen by the user.
In order to rank the documents, a ranking function is required, which
assigns relevancy scores to each index entry corresponding to a given search
query. In this thesis, we utilize the tf-idf metric for ranking the results,
where the details of the relevancy metrics used in information systems are
summarized in Section 3.5.
We assign tf-idf weights to each search term in each document. Instead of
using these weights directly, we assign relevancy levels based on the weights
of search terms. The proposed search scheme is conjunctive and requires the
document to contain all the queried search terms for a match.
We assume that there are Λ levels of ranking in our proposed method for
some integer Λ ≥ 1. For each document, each level stores an index entry for
search terms with higher weights of that document in a cumulative way in
descending order. This basically means that the ith level entry includes all
the keywords in the (i+ 1)th level and also the keywords that have sufficient
weight for the ith level. The higher the level, the higher the weight of the
search term is. For instance, if Λ = 3, level 1 index entry includes keywords
that occur at least once in the document while levels 2 and 3 include keywords
that have tf-idfw,R values at least, say 0.1 and 0.2
5, respectively. There are
several variations for relevancy score calculations [50] and we use a very basic
5The number of levels and the weights of each level can be chosen in any convenient
way.
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method. The relevancy score of a document is calculated as the number
representing the highest level search index entry that the query matches.
All the keywords that exist in a document are included in the first level
search index entry of that document as explained in Section 4.3.1. The
other higher level entries include the frequent keywords that also occur in its
previous level, but this time they have to occur the number of times, which
should at least be equal to the tf-idf of the corresponding level. The highest
level includes only the keywords that have the highest tf-idf values. In the
oblivious search phase, the server starts comparing the user query against the
first level index entries of each document. The matching documents found
as a result of the comparison in the first level are then compared with the
index entries in the other levels as shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Ranked Search
for all documents Di ∈ D do
Compare(level1 entry of Di , query)
j = 1
while match do
increment j
Compare (levelj entries of Di, query)
end while
rank of Di = highest level that match with query
end for
In this method, some information may be lost due to the ranking method
employed here. Rank of two documents will be the same if one involves all the
queried keywords infrequently and the other involves all the queried keywords
frequently except one infrequent one. The rank of the document is identified
with the least frequent keyword of the query. We tested the correctness of our
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ranking method by comparing with a commonly used formula for relevance
score calculation [19], given in the following:
Score(W , R) =
∑
w∈W
1
|R| tf-idfw,R (4.15)
where W is the set of search terms in a query and |R| is the length of the
document R.
We use the Reuters [49] dataset to compare the two ranking methods.
We generate a database of 10.000 documents and test with 100 queries of 2,
3, 4 and 5 genuine search terms each. In our proposed ranking there is no
ordering within the matches from the same level. The number of elements
matched in each level set is correlated with the number of levels.
• For the case where Λ = 5, 94% of the time the top match for the given
relevance score, is also in the top match level (i.e., matches with highest
level) for our proposed ranking method. Additionally, in 82% of the
time, at least 4 of the top 5 matches for the given relevance score are
in the top match level in our method.
• For the case where Λ = 6, 90% of the time the top match for the given
relevance score, is also in the top match level (i.e., matches with highest
level) for our proposed ranking method. Additionally, in 79% of the
time, at least 4 of the top 5 matches for the given relevance score is in
the top match level in our method.
Note that as Λ gets larger, number of genuine search terms in each level
decreases which causes less number of matches in top levels. Since a user asks
for top k rank levels, higher Λ provides user to retrieve accurate information
with less communication. Nevertheless, reducing the number of matches per
level slightly increase the probability of missing some top relevant documents
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in the top match level. For the given experiment on 10000 documents, aver-
age number of matching document entries for each level is given in Table 4.2.
The table shows that while in the lowest level, the average match rate is
approximately 0.5%, for the top level the match rate is about 0.03%.
Λ \ lvl 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 NA 3.8 11.7 21.9 28.2 59.2
6 2.7 9.5 15.6 23.4 25.3 46.7
Table 4.2: Number of matching documents per level
While this new method necessitates an additional r-bit storage per level
for a document, it reduces the communication overhead of the users since
matches with low rank documents will not be retrieved unless the user re-
quests. Considering Λ search entries are stored instead of a single search in-
dex entry per document, storage overhead for indexing mechanism increases
Λ times due to ranking. This additional cost is not a burden for the server
since the size of an index entry is usually negligibly small compared to actual
document sizes.
4.7 Privacy of the Method
The privacy-preserving multi-keyword search (MKS) method must provide
the user and data privacy requirements specified by definitions in Section 4.1.
This section is devoted to the proofs that the proposed method satisfies
these privacy requirements. In the proofs, we assume that the randomization
parameters are selected appropriately by taking into consideration of the
database or search statistics.
The proposed method is semantically secure against chosen keyword at-
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tacks under indistinguishability of ciphertext from ciphertext (ICC). The
formal proof is provided in Theorem 1 of [22] from which we adopt their
indexing method; therefore, we omit this proof here. Intuitively, the proof is
based on the property that, since the HMAC function is a pseudo random
function (PRF), the hash values of any two different keywords will be two
random numbers and be independent of each other. Therefore, given two key-
word lists L0, L1 and an index Ib for the keyword list Lb, where b ∈ {0, 1}, it
is not possible for an adversary to guess the value b with probability greater
than 1/2.
The security against chosen keyword attack is required, but not sufficient
for the privacy-preserving search scheme we define in Section 4.1. We consider
further privacy requirements that the work in [22] does not satisfy. The major
difference of our work from [22] is capability of hiding the search pattern.
Lemma 1. Given three queries Q0, Q1 and Q
′
b where b ∈ {0, 1} and Qb
and Q′b are generated from the same genuine search terms, for a suitable
parameter choice, the advantage of an attacker in finding b is very small.
Proof. In Section 4.4, it is shown that ∆(Q0, Q
′
b) ≈ ∆(Q1, Q′b) for the selected
values of U, V . Therefore, an attacker cannot do better than a random guess,
to find b, if the parameters U and V in the index generation are securely
chosen.
Note that, the values of the security parameters depend on the structure
of the database and any V ≥ 30, where U = 60, is a secure candidate pair
for our test database.
Theorem 1 (Query Privacy). The proposed MKS method, for a suitable
parameter choice, satisfies query privacy in accordance with Definition 3.
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Proof. Let the adversary A be an authorized user. Given the search term
lists L1 and L2, the attacker can get the corresponding trapdoors from the
data controller and generate corresponding queries. By Lemma 1, it is not
possible to correlate the generated query with the given query Qb unless
all the V random dummy keywords are also same. There are CUV possible
random choices of V for each set of search terms, where CUV is the number
of V -combinations from a set of U elements. Therefore, A needs to generate
and try CUV queries and compare with Qb. Generating a single query requires
choosing a set of V dummy keywords from the set U , combining the trapdoors
of those chosen keywords by bitwise product operation and finally comparing
with the given query Qb. For appropriate choice of U and V , generating C
U
V
queries and applying bitwise comparison for each of them is infeasible.
A numerical example that demonstrates the difficulty of the attack, for
the parameters that we use in our implementation is shown in the following
example.
Example 6. In our setting this operation should be repeated CUV = C
60
40 = 2
52
times. Note that assuming generating a single index from the trapdoors that
are given in advance followed with a binary comparison requires 0.1 ms, this
brute force search takes 104 years which is infeasible for all practical purposes.
Theorem 2 (Access Control). The proposed MKS method satisfies access
control in accordance with Definition 4.
Proof. All communication from the user to the data controller is authenti-
cated by a signature with the user’s private key. We assume that the private
key information of the authorized users is not compromised and we further
assume that the server is semi-honest. In order to impersonate an authorized
user with an RSA public-key eu, A needs to learn the private key du where
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eu · du = 1 mod φ(N). Therefore, the probability of impersonating an au-
thorized user is  where  is the probability of breaking the underlying RSA
signature scheme.
Lemma 2. Given the list of all previous queries Q and a single query Q, it
is not possible to find the list of queries from the set of queries Q that are
generated from exactly the same genuine keywords with Q.
Proof. The trivial approach will be one-by-one comparison of Q with each
element of Q. However, by Lemma 1, it is proven that adversary cannot
identify equality of queries with one-by-one comparison.
An advanced approach will be applying correlation attack. The adversary
may try to find a set of k queries that all possess a genuine search term w.
If the adversary can extract genuine search term information from a set of
queries, he can correlate Q with other queries that are generated from exactly
the same genuine keywords with Q. However, we have shown in Section 4.4.1
that it is not possible to apply correlation attack in our proposed scheme.
Lemma 3. Given the database (i.e., the searchable secure database index),
the list of all previous queries Q and a single query Q, it is not possible to find
the list of queries from the set of queries Q that are generated from exactly
the same genuine keywords with Q .
Proof. With the additional index file access information, the adversary (e.g.,
cloud server) can also use the information of the list of ordered matching
items with the query Q while comparing with other queries in Q. As shown
in Section 4.5, due to the additional fake document index entries, it is not
possible to correlate two queries using one-by-one comparison between the
lists of matching documents.
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Theorem 3 (Search Pattern Privacy). The proposed MKS method satisfies
search pattern privacy in accordance with Definition 5.
Proof. By lemma 2, it is shown that the query information do not leak useful
search pattern information. By lemma 3, it is shown that the information of
retrieved matching entries with a given query does not leak search pattern
information. Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies search pattern privacy.
Theorem 4 (Adaptive Semantic Security). The proposed MKS method pro-
vides adaptive semantic security in accordance with Definition 11.
Proof. Let the original view v(Hn) and the trace γ(Hn) be
v(Hn) ={(id(C1), ..., id(Cl)), C, I,Q, Dsig(Q)}
γ(Hn) ={(id(C1), ..., id(Cl)), (|C1|, ..., |Cl|), |Dsig(Q)|, |I|, Ap(Hn)}.
Further let,
v∗(Hn) = {(id∗(C1), . . . , id∗(Cl)), C∗, I∗,Q∗, Dsig(Q)∗} be the view simu-
lated by the simulator S. The proposed method is adaptive semantically
secure if v(Hn) is indistinguishable from v
∗(Hn).
• The first component of the view v(Hn) is the document identifiers id(Ci)
which are also available in trace. Hence, S can trivially simulate doc-
ument identifiers as id∗(C) = id(C). Since id∗(C) = id(C), they are
indistinguishable.
• Each user identifier is encrypted using a pseudo-randomness against
chosen plaintext attack (PCPA) secure encryption method (e.g., AES
in CTR mode). The output of a PCPA-secure encryption method [18]
is by definition indistinguishable from a random number that has the
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same size with ciphertext. For simulating the ciphertexts C, S as-
signs l random numbers to C∗ such that C∗ = {C∗1 , . . . , C∗l }, where
∀i, |C∗i | = |Ci|. Note that size of each ciphertext is available in the
trace. Considering for all i, Ci and C
∗
i are indistinguishable, C and C
∗
are also indistinguishable.
• The secure searchable index I is composed of index entries for each
genuine profile and fake profiles. Note that, each index entry is gener-
ated by applying “bit-wise product” operation on the HMAC outputs
of each attribute value in the profile. S simulates the searchable in-
dex I, by generating |I| index entries using the public HMAC function
with a random key S chooses. For each entry in simulated I∗, S ran-
domly selects a set of U attributes (e.g., random strings) and apply the
HMAC and the reduction methods accordingly, where U is the num-
ber of dummy elements introduced in the index entries as defined in
Section 4.4. An index entry in I∗ is generated with exactly the same
method as an entry in I other than the HMAC key. Hence, an entry
of I∗ is indistinguishable from an entry in I. Moreover, both real and
simulated index has the same number of index entries (i.e., |I| = |I∗|).
Therefore, I is indistinguishable from I∗.
• Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} is a set of n consecutive queries where each query
Qi is a bitwise product of trapdoors for the search keywords of Qi. |Qi|
is the number of keywords in query Qi. Note that each trapdoor is an
output of the HMAC function which is a random bit string of size r,
where r
2d
bits are expected to be zero.
Simulator S generates Q∗ as follows. For each Q∗i , S generates |Qi|
random binary strings where the number of zero bits is a random num-
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ber with mean r
2d
and take the bit-wise product of those |Qi| strings to
generate Q∗i . The number of search terms |Qi| is available in the trace.
Both Qi and Q
∗
i are bit-wise products of same number of bit stings of
length r with same number of expected zeros. Therefore Qi and Q
∗
i are
indistinguishable. Since ∀i Qi and Q∗i are indistinguishable, Q and Q∗
are also indistinguishable.
• The RSA signature of a query Dsig(Qi) is a random looking num-
ber of size |Dsig(Qi)| (i.e., size of public key N) which is available in
trace γ(Hn). To simulate Dsig(Q), S assign n random numbers of size
|Dsig(Qi)| to Dsig(Q)∗. ∀i Dsig(Qi) and Dsig(Qi)∗ are two random
numbers of same length and indistinguishable. Hence, Dsig(Q) and
Dsig(Q)∗ are also indistinguishable.
The simulated view v∗ is indistinguishable from genuine view v since each
component of v and v∗ are indistinguishable. Hence, the proposed method
satisfies adaptive semantic security.
4.8 Complexity
In this section, we present an extensive cost analysis of the proposed tech-
nique. The communication and computation costs will be analyzed sepa-
rately. Especially, low costs on the user side are crucial for rendering the
proposed technique feasible for mobile applications, where the users usu-
ally perform the search through resource-constrained devices such as smart
phones. We use both real and synthetic data sets in our analysis. The used
real data set is a part (10.000 documents) of the RCV1 (Reuters Corpus
Volume 1), which is a corpus of newswire stories made available by Reuters,
Ltd. [49].
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• Communication Costs:
Two steps in the proposed method are identified, where communication
is required: i) for learning the trapdoor and ii) for sending the query
and receiving the results.
1. Between the user and the data controller, for learning the trap-
door: To build a query, the user first determines the bin IDs of
the keywords he wants to search for and send these values to the
data controller. Let γ be the number of genuine search terms the
user queries. Then the user sends at most 32 · γ bits to the data
controller together with a signature since each bin ID is repre-
sented by a 32 bit integer. The data controller replies with the
HMAC keys that belong to those bins. The reply is encrypted
with the user’s public-key, so the size of the result is logN . Note
that if two search terms happen to map to the same bin, then
sending only one of them will be sufficient since their responses
will be the same.
2. Between the user and the search server, for query: After learning
the trapdoor keys, the user calculates the query and transmits it
to the server. The size of the query is r bits, independent from
γ, so the user transmits only r bits. Let α be the number of in-
dex entries matched with the query. The server returns the index
entries of the matching documents whose size is α · r bits in to-
tal. Note that size of the encrypted document depends on the
size of the actual document. Independent of the used scheme,
all privacy-preserving search methods return the encrypted docu-
ment, therefore the communication cost of document retrieval is
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not considered here. In the case where the ranking is used, only
the top τ matches are returned to the user by the server instead
of α where τ ≤ α.
The communication costs are summarized in Table 4.3.
Trapdoor Search
User 32 · γ + logN r
Data
Controller logN 0
search server 0 α · r
Table 4.3: Communication costs incurred by each party (in bits)
• Computation Costs:
Among the three parties participated in the protocol, computation cost
of the user is the most crucial one. The data controller and the server
can be implemented on quite powerful machines, however the users may
be using resource-constrained devices.
1. User: After receiving trapdoor keys from the data controller,
query is generated as explained in Section 4.3, which is essentially
equivalent to performing hash operations6.
2. search server: The search server performs only the search oper-
ation, which is binary comparison of r-bit query with (q + 2) · σ
database entries, each of which is again an r-bit binary sequence.
Note that there are σ genuine database entries, σ fake entries
6Computing bitwise product is negligible compared the overall operations the user
performs.
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added for hiding bit positions of dummy keywords (Section 4.4.3),
and q · σ fake entries added for hiding response pattern (Sec-
tion 4.5), which add up to a total of (q+ 2) ·σ database entries. If
the ranking is used, the query should also be compared with higher
level index entries of the matching documents. So the server per-
forms Λ additional binary comparison of r-bit index entries for
each matching document, where Λ is the number of levels.
3. Data Controller: The data controller creates the index file and
symmetric-key encryption operations of all documents; but these
operations are performed only once in the initialization phase.
Other than this, data controller is active while the user learns the
trapdoors, which requires one encryption and one signature. This
is equivalent to 2 modular exponentiation operations.
The computation costs are summarized in Table 4.4.
User 1 hash and bit-wise product
Data Controller initialization phase
2 modular exponentiation per search
Index Server (q + 2) · σ · Λ binary comparison over r-bit index entries
Table 4.4: Computation costs incurred by each party
4.8.1 Implementation Results
The entire system is implemented by Java language using socket program-
ming on an iMac with Intel Core i7 processor of 2.93 GHz. Considering
that initial document analysis for finding the keywords in the document is
out of the scope of this work, a synthetic database is created by assigning
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random keywords with random term frequencies for each document. The
HMAC function produces outputs, whose size (l) is 336 bytes (2688 bit),
which is generated by concatenating different SHA2-based HMAC functions.
We choose d = 6 so that after the reduction phase the result is reduced to
one-sixth of the original result; therefore the size of each database index entry
and (r) is 56 bytes (448 bits).
In our experiments, we used different data sets with different number of
documents (from 2000 to 10000 documents). The timing results for creating
the queries are obtained for documents with 30 genuine search terms and 60
random keywords each using ranking technique with different rank levels for
parameters q = 1 and f = 5 in Figure 4.11(a). Considering that index gener-
ation is performed only occasionally (if not once) by the data controller and
that index generation problem is of highly paralleled nature, the proposed
technique presents a highly efficient and practical solution to the described
problem.
Figure 4.11(b) demonstrates the server timings for a search with different
rank levels. As can be observed from the graphic in Figure 4.11(b), time
spent by the server per query is quite low, rendering high-throughput for the
processing of user queries possible. By parallelization and native language
support, the throughput can be increased by several orders of magnitude.
Most of the privacy-preserving search methods that exist in the literature
are only capable of single keyword search. The problem that we consider is
multi-keyword search; therefore, we did not provide a comparison with the
works that consider only single keyword search. A very recent work by Cao
et al. [23] is the closest work to our proposed method. Our implementa-
tions show that our method is one to two orders of magnitude faster than
the method in [23] in both off line and on line operations. The index con-
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Figure 4.11: Timing results
struction method of [23], takes about 4500 s for 6000 documents while we
need only 140 s in the highest rank level. Similarly the work in [23] requires
600 ms to perform a search over 6000 documents where we need only 4.7 ms.
The tests in [23] were done on an equivalent computer, Intel Xeon proces-
sor 2.93 GHz. Among the other existing multi-keyword solutions, bilinear
pairing based methods such as [15] provide only theoretical solutions. The
method in [15] is not implemented due to its excessive computational re-
quirements hence, cannot be compared with our proposed work. The work
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of Wang et. al. [22], which is the inspiration for our proposed method, pro-
vides a faster solution than our work since they do not use additional fake
entries or dummy keywords. However, that work does not satisfy some of
the privacy requirements that we are interested in (cf. Section 4.7), such as
hiding search pattern privacy.
The low time requirements on the data controller side enable processing
multiple requests with high-throughput. Note that the programs used in
the experiments are developed in Java language for portability reasons and
unoptimized. Further optimization or support of native code or parallel
implementation will further increase the performance of the proposed system.
4.9 Chapter Summary
The solution proposed in this chapter, addresses the problem of privacy-
preserving ranked multi-keyword search, where the database is outsourced
to a semi-honest remote server. Our formal definitions pertaining to the pri-
vacy requirements of a secure search method are based on a comprehensive
analysis of possible attack scenarios. One particular privacy issue concerning
linking of queries featuring the identical search terms is often overlooked in
the literature. When an attacker is able to identify queries featuring the
same search terms by inspecting the queries, their responses and database
and search term statistics, he can mount successful attacks. Therefore, the
proposed privacy-preserving search scheme essentially implements an efficient
method to satisfy query unlinkability based on query and response random-
ization and cryptographic techniques. Query randomization cost is negligible
for the data controller and even less for the user. Response randomization,
on the other hand, results in a communication overhead when the response
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to a query is returned to the user since some fake matches are included in
the response. However, we show that the overhead can be minimized with
the optimal choice of parameters. The true cost is due to the additional
storage for extended index file and the actual search time. This can also
be minimized by proper selection of the parameters (i.e., the ratio of fake
index entries to real index entries). On the other hand, the storage is usu-
ally not a real concern for the cloud servers, considering that index file is
relatively small compared to the document sizes. As for the search time, the
proposed technique is extremely efficient that a relative increase in search
time can easily be tolerated. Our implementation results confirm this claim
by demonstrating search time over a database of 10, 000 documents, includ-
ing ranking, takes only a couple of milliseconds. Considering that the search
algorithm easily yields to the most straightforward parallelization technique
such as MapReduce, the overhead in search time due to the proposed ran-
domization method effectively raises no difficulty.
Selection of parameters involves some knowledge about the database and
therefore, a priori analysis is required. However, our proposal needs only the
frequency of the most used search terms and number of search terms used
in queries. The formulation for parameter selection is simple and easy to
calculate. Furthermore, we do not need to repeat the calculation process for
different datasets. One can easily specify an upper bound on the frequency
of the most used search terms and number of search terms that can be used
for many cases.
Ranking capability is incorporated to the scheme which enables the user
to retrieve only the most relevant matches. The accuracy of the proposed
ranking method is compared with a commonly used relevance calculation
method where privacy is not an issue. The comparison shows that the pro-
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posed method is successful to return highly relevant documents.
We implement the entire scheme and extensive experimental results using
both real and synthetic datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency
of our solution.
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Chapter 5
MINHASH-BASED SECURE
SEARCH METHOD
The work presented in Chapter 4 provides a secure and efficient search
method that hides the search pattern. The drawback of this method is the
provided ranking approach. As explained in Section 4.6, the work presented
in Chapter 4 supports only a fixed number of rank levels, where all the doc-
uments that match with the same level have the same rank such that, ranks
of two documents will be the same even if one contains all the queried terms
infrequently and the other one contains all the queried terms very frequently
except only one infrequent term. Moreover, in the work given in Chapter 4,
some fake document index entries are introduced in the searchable index as
explained in Section 4.5. Those fake documents may match with the query
with some probability given in equation (4.10), which is used for hiding the
search pattern. However, the user then needs to sanitize the final result
from the fake matches, which brings an extra burden on the user. In this
chapter, we propose an alternative secure multi-keyword search scheme, that
provides better ranking capability together with enhanced security require-
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ments. The MinHash-based secure search model given in this thesis, has
two versions. The first version, which we refer as the single server model, is
very fast but some sensitive information is allowed to leak due to efficiency
reasons. The single server model is presented in the IEEE CLOUD 2013 con-
ference [38]. In the second version, which is referred as the two server model,
the sensitive information that is allowed to leak in the single server model,
is also hidden. However, due to the cryptographic primitives, the two server
case, is not as efficient as the first one. There is a strict trade off between
privacy and efficiency, and in the two server model, we managed to increase
the privacy of the method while keeping the increase in the computational
cost at an acceptable level. Both the single and the two server models provide
multi-keyword search with ranking capability.
The both models proposed in this chapter consider the same problem of
privacy-preserving keyword search over encrypted cloud data for the database
outsourcing scenario as the model proposed in Chapter 4.
5.1 Single Server Framework
In the setting for the single server model, we assume the data owner does
not have sufficient resources or is unwilling to store the whole database. He
outsources the data to an untrusted, semi-honest server, but maintains the
ability to search without revealing anything except the access and search
patterns.
The data owner encrypts the sensitive documents to be outsourced and
generates a searchable index using the features of these sensitive documents.
In an oﬄine stage, both searchable index and the encrypted documents are
outsourced to a semi-honest cloud. Then, authorized users can perform
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Figure 5.1: Framework of the model with a single server
search on the cloud and receive the encrypted documents that match with
their queries. During this process, the cloud server should not learn anything
other than what the data owner allows to leak. Finally, user decrypts the
retrieved documents using the decryption keys. The steps and typical inter-
actions between the participants of the system are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The method is formalized as follows. Let D be the set of sensitive docu-
ments and Fi be the set of features (i.e., keywords) of Di ∈ D. There are four
algorithms in the scheme, namely: setup, index generation, query generation
and search.
1. Setup(Ψ): Given a security parameter Ψ, it generates a secret key
K ∈ {0, 1}Ψ.
2. IndexGeneration(K,D): Given the collection of sensitive documents
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D, it extracts the feature set Fi for each document Di ∈ D and gener-
ates a searchable secure index I via encryption with the key K.
3. QueryGeneration(K,F ): Generates a query Q for the given set of
features F with key K.
4. Search(I, Q): Query Q is compared with the searchable index I and
returns encrypted versions Ci of the matching documents Di.
The details of these algorithms are given in Section 5.2.
5.1.1 Security Model
The privacy definition for almost all of the existing efficient privacy-preserving
search schemes allows the server to learn some information such as the search
and access patterns. Therefore, due to efficiency concerns, the proposed sin-
gle server search method, also leaks search and access pattern, but nothing
else.
The definitions of Search pattern (Sp), Access pattern (Ap), History (Hn)
and Adaptive Semantic Security, are as given in Section 4.1. The definitions
of Trace and View, are redefined in this section, since the contents of trace
and view are different in this model.
Definition 18. Trace (γ(Hn)) Let C = {C1, . . . , C|D|} be the set of en-
crypted documents, |D| be the number of documents in the dataset, id(Ci)
be the identifier of Ci and |Ci| be the size of Ci. The trace of Hn is defined
as γ(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), (|C1|, . . . , |C|D||), Sp(Hn), Ap(Hn)}. We
allow to leak the trace to an adversary and guarantee no other information
is leaked.
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Definition 19. View (v) is the information that is accessible to an adver-
sary. Let I be the secure searchable index and, id(Ci) and Q are as defined
above. The view of Hn is defined as v(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), C, I,Q}.
5.2 Single Server MinHash-based Method
In this section, we provide the crucial steps of our proposed method. Search
over encrypted cloud data is performed through an encrypted searchable
index that is generated by the data owner and outsourced to the cloud server.
Given a query, the server compares the query with the searchable index and
returns the results without learning anything other than the information that
is allowed to be leaked due to efficiency concerns.
5.2.1 Secure Index Generation
Our proposed method utilizes the idea of bucketization which is a data par-
titioning technique widely used in the literature [43, 45, 20]. Here, each
object is distributed into several buckets via MinHash functions introduced
in Section 3.3.2 and the bucket-id is used as an identifier for each object
in that bucket. This method maps objects such that the number of buck-
ets, in which two objects collide, increases as the similarity between those
objects increases. In other words, while two identical objects collide in all
of the buckets, number of common buckets decreases as similarity between
objects decreases. The proposed secure index is generated by the data owner
utilizing the following phases, namely: feature extraction, bucket index con-
struction and bucket index encryption. These three phases are explained in
the following.
1) Feature Extraction: For each document Di ∈ D, the set of features
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Fi = {fi1, . . . , fiz} that characterize the document is extracted. In our case,
those features are composed of two values fij = (wij, rsij). The first one is a
keyword wij of the sensitive document Di. The second one is the relevancy
score (rs), which is based on the tf-idf value of the keyword wij for the
document Di as explained in Section 3.5. This relevancy score is later used
in the search method (cf. Section 5.7.3) while ranking the matching results.
2) Bucket Index Construction: We first construct a MinHash struc-
ture by selecting λ random permutations on the set of all possible keywords
(∆). We then apply the MinHash on the first values of each feature set
Fi[0] = {wi1, . . . , wiz} as shown in Section 3.3.2 and generate a signature for
each document as:
Sig(Di) = {hP1(Fi[0]), . . . , hPλ(Fi[0])}.
Note that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, hPi(Fj[0]) ∈ Fj[0]. In other words, each signature
element of a document is a keyword for that document.
Then, feature set of each document is mapped to λ buckets using the
elements of the signature. Suppose hPi(Fj[0]) = wk, then we create a bucket
with bucket identifier Bik, and identifiers and relevancy scores of all the docu-
ments that satisfy this property are added to this bucket. The bucket content
is a vector of integer elements of size |D|, where |D| is the number of docu-
ments in the outsourced data set. Let Bik be a bucket identifier and VBik be
the integer vector,
VBik [id(Dj)] =
rsjk, if hPi(Fj[0]) = B
i
k and VBik [id(Dj)] = 0,
0, otherwise.
(5.1)
3) Bucket Index Encryption: In this step, we hide the bucket identi-
fiers and bucket contents due to privacy requirements.
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Bucket identifier Bik is a sensitive information since it may reveal a search
term in a query that matches with a bucket, so it cannot be kept as plaintext.
Moreover, the server should be able to map the given encrypted bucket id
to the one kept in the server, without knowing the decryption keys. Hence,
the encryption method used for hiding the bucket identifier must be a de-
terministic scheme. One of the most efficient methods that hides a value in
a deterministic way is HMAC functions which are essentially cryptographic
hash functions that utilize secret keys. In our proposed scheme, decryption
of the encrypted bucket identifier is not required so an HMAC function is
used for hiding the bucket identifiers. Any pseudo random function (PRF)
can also be used, but we preferred HMAC functions due to their efficiency.
The secret key of HMAC function (Kid) is only known by the data owner
and never revealed to the server.
The content of a bucket (i.e., VBik) possesses sensitive information such
as the pseudo identifiers of the documents in that bucket and their rele-
vancy scores. These information must also be protected from the untrusted
server, hence should be outsourced to the server only after encryption. A
proper approach for encrypting bucket contents would be using a PCPA-
secure [18] (Pseudorandomness against chosen plaintext attacks) encryption
method such as AES in CTR mode with a secret key (Kcontent).
Let max be the maximum size of a searchable index I and cnt be the
number of real elements (i.e., number of buckets) in the index. We add
max − cnt dummy elements to the index in order to hide the number of
buckets. The dummy elements (pidumi ,Vdumi) are randomly generated with
the condition that
|piBjk | = |pidumi| and |VBjk | = |Vdumi |.
The secure index generation method is summarized in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 Single Server Index Generation
Require: ∆:set of possible keywords, D: collection of documents, h: λ Min-
Hash functions, Ψ: security parameter
Kid = Setup(Ψ), Kcontent = Setup(Ψ)
for all Di ∈ D do
Fi ← extract features of Di
Sig(Di) = {hP1(Fi[0]), . . . , hPλ(Fi[0])}
for j = 1→ λ do
Bjk = Sig(Di)[j − 1]
if Bjk /∈ bucket identifier list then
add Bjk to bucket identifier list
create VBjk
end if
add rsik to vector VBjk
[id(Di)]
end for
end for
for all Bjk ∈ bucket identifier list do
piBjk
← HMACKid(Bjk)
VBjk ← EncKcontent(VBjk)
add (piBjk
,VBjk) to secure index I
end for
add max− cnt dummy elements (pidumi ,Vdumi)
return I
Subsequent to the index generation, data owner encrypts each document
in the dataset D as Ωid(Di) = EncKdata(Di) and outsources this set of en-
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crypted documents EDoc to the server with the I, where
EDoc = {(id(D1),Ωid(D1)), . . . , (id(D|D|),Ωid(D|D|))}.
5.2.2 Query Generation and Search
The query generation is constructed in a similar way to the index generation
phase (Section 5.2.1) and exact steps are detailed in Algorithm 5. Given
a feature set of n keywords to be queried (i.e., F = {w′1, . . . , w′n}), the user
first creates the query signature from this feature set using the same MinHash
functions that are used in the index generation phase. Then, for each signa-
ture element, the corresponding bucket identifier is hashed with the key Kid.
The query Q is this list of hashed bucket identifiers (i.e., Q = {pi1, . . . , piλ}).
Note that independent of the number of search terms in a query (n), the
query signature has λ elements and therefore, the information of n is not
leaked to the server.
Algorithm 5 Single Server Query Generation
Require: F : feature set of the keywords to be queried,
h: λ minhash functions, Kid: encryption key
Sig(F ) = {hP1(F [0]), . . . , hPλ(F [0])}
for j = 1→ λ do
Bjk = Sig(F )[j − 1]
piBjk
← HMACKid(Bjk)
Q[j − 1] = piBjk
end for
return Q
Given a query Q, the server finds the encrypted vectors (VBjk) corre-
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sponding to the bucket identifiers in Q. The server then sends back the λ
encrypted vectors EV = {V1, . . . ,Vλ} to the user. After receiving the buck-
ets, user decrypts the vectors and ranks the data identifiers as it is detailed
in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.3 Document Retrieval
The user wants to avoid returning unrelated documents since this immedi-
ately bring forth an unnecessary communication burden. Hence, user tends to
retrieve only the top t matches, instead of returning all documents that share
at least one bucket with the query. The standard formulation for calculating
the document-term weights is tf-idf (cf. Section 3.5) which is commonly used
for relevance score calculation in search methods. Therefore, we also utilize
the tf-idf values for ranking the matching results.
Upon receiving the requested encrypted vectors EV = {V1, . . . ,Vλ}, the
user decrypts those vectors and get the plain vectors as Vi = DecKcontent(Vi).
Then the documents are sorted according to their scores. Note that Vi[id(Dj)]
is the tf-idf value of document Dj for i
th bucket.
In the index generation phase, each document is mapped to a certain
number of buckets using the output of the MinHash functions and tf-idf value
of the MinHash output is assigned as the relevancy score of that document for
that bucket. Similarly query Q is also mapped to some λ buckets. The score
of a document Dj (i.e., score(id(Dj))) is the summation of the relevancy
scores for the buckets that both document and query share, which is defined
as follows:
score(id(Dj)) =
λ∑
i=1
Vi[id(Dj)]. (5.2)
As the score(id(Dj)) gets higher, the relevancy of the document to the query
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is expected to increase.
After the ranking phase, the user retrieves the top t matches from the
server. The document retrieval method is summarized in Algorithm 6. As
the database is updated by adding or removing documents, tf-idf values need
to be recalculated and indices should be updated accordingly. However, we
assume the database is highly static, hence the update is done infrequently.
5.3 Privacy for the Single Server Model
The privacy-preserving search scheme that we propose is adaptive semanti-
cally secure according to Definition 11.
Theorem 5. The proposed method satisfies adaptive semantic security in
accordance with Definition 11.
Proof. Let the original view v(Hn) and the trace γ(Hn) be
v(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), C, I,Q},
γ(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), (|C1|, . . . , |C|D||), Simp(Hn), Ap(Hn)}.
Further let v∗(Hn) = {(id∗(C1), . . . , id∗(C|D|)), C∗, I∗,Q∗} be the view
simulated by the simulator S. The proposed method is adaptive semantically
secure if v(Hn) is indistinguishable from v
∗(Hn).
• The first component of the view view(Hn) is the document identifiers
id(Ci) which are also available in trace. Hence, S can trivially simulate
document identifiers as id∗(C) = id(C). Since id∗(C) = id(C), they
are indistinguishable.
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Algorithm 6 Single Server Document Retrieval
USER:
Require: EV : encrypted vectors, Kcontent: secret key,
t: limit for number of documents to retrieve
for all Vi ∈ EV do
Vi ← DecKcontent(Vi)
end for
for j = 1→ |Vi| do
score(j) =
∑λ
i=1 Vi[j]
end for
sort score list
idList ← identifiers of top t scores
send idList to Server
SERVER
Require: idList: requested document identifiers, EDoc: outsourced en-
crypted documents
for all id ∈idList do
if (id,Ωid) ∈ EDoc then
send (id,Ωid) to user
end if
end for
USER:
Did ← DecKdata(Ωid)
93
• Each document is encrypted using a PCPA-secure1 encryption method
(e.g., AES in CTR mode). The output of a PCPA-secure encryption
method [18] is by definition indistinguishable from a random number
that has the same size with ciphertext. To simulate ciphertexts C, S
assigns l random numbers to C∗ such that C∗ = {C∗1 , . . . , C∗|D|}, where
∀i, |C∗i | = |Ci|. Note that, size of each ciphertext is available in the
trace. Considering for all i, Ci and C
∗
i are indistinguishable, C and C
∗
are also indistinguishable.
• Note that I is composed of encrypted bucket identifiers and correspond-
ing encrypted bucket content vectors. Let sizeB and sizeV be the sizes
of bucket identifier and bucket content, respectively. Further let max
be the maximum number of buckets that may occur in I. Simulator S
generates max index elements, I∗[i] = (pi∗i ,V∗i ) such that pi∗i is a ran-
dom number, where |pi∗i | = sizeB and V∗i is another random number,
where |V∗i | = sizeV . Note that pi∗i and pii are indistinguishable since
pii is the output of a random function (i.e., HMAC) where the out-
put is indistinguishable from a random number. Similarly, V∗i and Vi
are indistinguishable since Vi is a cipher of a PCPA-secure encryption
method. Hence, I is indistinguishable from I∗.
• Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} is a set of n consecutive queries where each query Qi
is composed of λ encrypted bucket identifiers (i.e., Q = {pi1, . . . , piλ}). S
can simulate the queries using the similarity pattern (Simp). Let Qi[j]
be the jth element of Qi where sizeB is the size of bucket identifier.
1We used a PCPA-secure encryption in our analysis which is in parallel with the lit-
erature. However, an encryption that is secure against chosen keyword attack (IND2-
CKA) [16] can also be used, but the corresponding security proof should be modified
accordingly.
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If ∃p, r 1 ≤ p ≤ i and 1 ≤ r ≤ λ such that Simp[i[j], p[r]] = 1
set Q∗i [j] = Q
∗
p[r]. Otherwise, set Q
∗
i [j] to a random value R
j
i where
|Rji | = sizeB. Note that for all i, Qi is indistinguishable from Q∗i since
Qi is the output of a pseudorandom permutation and Q
∗
i is a random
number, and they are of the same length.
The simulated view v∗ is indistinguishable from genuine view v since each
component of v and v∗ are indistinguishable. Hence, the proposed method
satisfies adaptive semantic security.
5.4 Experiments (Single Server)
In this section, we extensively analyze the proposed method in order to
demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the scheme. The entire system
is implemented by Java language using a 32-bit Windows 7 operating system
with Intel Pentium Dual-Core processor of 2.30GHz. In our experiments we
use the publicly available Enron dataset [51].
The success of the search method is analyzed using the precision and
recall metrics (cf. Section3.6).
The matching items are ordered according to the relevancy scores (cf.
Section 3.5) and only items with top t scores are retrieved. We analyzed the
effect of the number of MinHash functions (λ) on the accuracy of the method
for a fixed threshold t = 15, by taking the average of 1500 queries with
number of features differ from 2 to 6 (i.e., 300 queries per each feature size).
As Figure 5.2 demonstrates, recall of the proposed scheme is 1 for any λ ≥ 150
implying that all of the items that contain all the features in the given query
are retrieved by the user. For the database outsourcing scenario that we
consider, it is crucial that the user retrieves all the documents matching with
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Figure 5.2: Success Rates as λ change for t = 15
the queried feature set. Precision is rather small, which indicates about 40%
of the retrieved documents contain all the queried features. Nevertheless, the
other retrieved items are still relevant with the query. Those items contain a
subset of the query features and the matching features have high relevancy
scores indicating that the matching item is highly relevant to the query even
when not all the features are captured. Note that, an item that has no
matching feature with a query has zero relevancy score, hence cannot match
with the query. We set λ = 150 since it satisfies the best precision rate while
ensuring full recall.
We analyze the impact of the number of keywords in a query on the
precision and recall rates and present the results in Figure 5.3. The similarity
between query and document signatures increases as the number of common
keywords increases. Hence, both the precision and recall rates of the method
increase as the number of keywords in a query increases. The increase in
success rate indicates our proposed method is even more useful for searches
with more than 5 keywords.
We test the efficiency of our proposed method using various dataset sizes
from 4000 to 10000 documents. The most costly operation of our method is
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Figure 5.3: Impact of number of keywords in a query and t on the precision
(a) and recall (b) rates
the index generation. Figure 5.4 shows that the index generation operation
takes about a few minutes and linearly increases as the number of documents
increases. Considering this operation is only performed in an oﬄine stage
by the data owner, the method is practical. One of the most important
parameters of privacy-preserving search is the query response time since this
operation is used very frequently and the users want to access their search
97
results as fast as possible. Search operation does not depend on the number
of documents since, in the proposed method search is performed by retrieving
λ requested buckets which is constant. The average query response time for
the single server search method, where λ = 150 is 210 ms, independent of
the number of documents in the dataset.
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Figure 5.4: Timings for index construction for λ = 150
The user then needs to decrypt the encrypted content vectors and request
the documents with the highest relevancy scores.
The communication cost of the user for the single server case has two
phases. First, the encrypted matching vectors (|EV | = λ|Vi|bits) are received
and in the next phase matching encrypted documents are received.
Most of the secure search methods in the literature do not support mul-
tiple features in queries. We do not provide any comparison with those
single keyword search methods but compare our proposed method with the
existing secure multi-keyword search methods instead. Some of the multi-
keyword search methods utilize bilinear mapping such as [15]. This approach
has similar security requirements with our proposed method, such that it re-
veals search and access pattern but nothing else. Unfortunately, this work
is not implemented by the authors due to excessive computational require-
ments. In this work, each search operation does about 2l bilinear mapping
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operation where l is the number of features in a document, which is not
practical due to the cost of bilinear map operations. A recent work by Cao
et al. [23] utilizes matrix multiplication operations where the number of rows
is determined by the size of the complete feature set. This method performs
index construction for 6000 documents in about 4500 s, while we perform
the same operation in less than 600 s. Similarly, the search operation over
6000 documents in [23] requires 600 ms, while we perform in about 210 ms.
Our HMAC-based method [39] performs efficiently in both index construc-
tion and search operations. However the ranking of that method is not as
accurate as the MinHash-based method and its security is ad-hoc, where
random elements are added for hiding the properties of the genuine features.
5.5 Two Server Framework
In this work, we consider privacy-preserving keyword search over encrypted
cloud data for the public storage system model. In our setting, we assume
there are three entities in the system, namely: Data owner, two non-colluding
semi-honest servers and users. The steps and typical interactions between
the participants of the system are illustrated in Figure 5.5.
• Data Owner is the actual owner and provider of the data. We assume
that, the data owner does not have sufficient expertise or resource to
store the whole database, hence outsources it to the cloud. While
the data owner and other authorized users retain the ability to search
over the data, no sensitive information is leaked to the cloud server
provider. In order to hide the sensitive data from the servers, the data
owner encrypts it before outsourcing and generates a searchable secure
index using the features of the sensitive data.
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Figure 5.5: The framework of the method with two non-colluding servers
• Cloud Server is a semi-trusted professional entity that offers storage
and computation services. In our setting, we utilize two non-colluding
servers; namely the search server and the file server. The data owner
outsources the searchable secure index to the search server and the ac-
tual encrypted documents are outsourced to the file server. Given a
query to the search server, the encrypted search results (i.e., scores)
are sent to the file server from the search server. The file server then
decrypts the results and sends the corresponding encrypted documents
with top t scores, to the user in a relevancy ordered way. The main
reason of the necessity of two servers is that, in the single server case,
the server can correlate a query with the matching document identi-
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fiers [38], which may cause some important information leakage such
as revealing the search pattern (cf. Section 5.6).
• Users can apply secure search over the cloud server by generating a
query using the search features. The query, which is also encrypted, is
sent to the search server and the corresponding encrypted documents
that match with the query is received from the file server. During this
process, neither of the servers learn anything other than what the data
owner allows to leak. Finally, user decrypts the retrieved documents
using the decryption key.
The method is formalized as follows. Let D be the set of documents and
Fi be the set of features (i.e., keywords) of Di ∈ D. There are four algorithms
in the scheme, namely: setup, index generation, query generation and search.
1. Setup(Ψ): Given a security parameter Ψ, it generates a secret key
K ∈ {0, 1}Ψ.
2. IndexGeneration(K,D): Given the collection of sensitive documents
D, it extracts the feature set Fi for each document Di ∈ D and gener-
ates a searchable secure index I via encryption with the key K.
3. QueryGeneration(K,F ): Generates a query Q for the given set of
features F using the key K.
4. Search(I, Q): Query Q is compared with the searchable secure index
I and returns encrypted versions of the matching documents Di.
The details of these algorithms are given in Section 5.7.
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5.6 Two Server Security Model
The two server setting can provide enhanced security requirements compared
to the single server setting such as the search pattern is not leaked. The server
may have some background information such as the search frequency statis-
tics of some keywords. If the search pattern is leaked, this information can
be combined with the search frequency statistics to deduce certain keywords
in the query. Hence, avoiding the leakage of search pattern is of paramount
importance. In this section we provide the privacy definitions, which are
partially borrowed from, but not limited to, the ones provided in Section 4.1.
The definitions of Search pattern (Sp), Access pattern (Ap), History (Hn)
and Adaptive Semantic Security, are as given in Section 4.1. The definitions
of Trace and View, are redefined in this section since the contents of trace
and view are different in this model.
Definition 20. -Probability Distinguishability: Let Qa and Qb be two
queries that are generated from the feature sets Fa and Fb, respectively. Fur-
ther let there exists a keyword w that both queries contain (i.e., w ∈ Fa and
w ∈ Fb). Also let a query Q be represented as a set of encrypted signature
elements as given in Section 3.3.2 (i.e., Q = {pi1, . . . , pi|Q|}).
A privacy-preserving keyword search method provides -probability dis-
tinguishability if, the probability that the both queries Qa and Qb, have a
common element piw due to the keyword w, is less than . Specifically, the
privacy preserving search scheme satisfies -probability distinguishability if,
prob(Qa ∩Qb 6= ∅) ≤ , (5.3)
where  is a security parameter.
Definition 21. δ-Mean Query Obfuscation: Let Q,Q0 and Q1 be three
queries such that for b ∈R {0, 1}, Qb be generated from the same feature set,
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F that is used in Q and Q1−b be generated from a different feature set. A
privacy-preserving keyword search method provides δ-mean query obfuscation
if, given Q,Q0 and Q1, the difference of the expected distances between, two
equivalent queries and two arbitrary queries, is less than δ. Specifically, the
privacy preserving search scheme satisfies δ-mean query obfuscation if,
Exp [|d(Q,Q0)− d(Q,Q1)|] ≤ δ, (5.4)
where δ is a security parameter and d(x, y) is any proper distance metric.
Definition 22. Similarity Pattern (Simp) is the same with Sp with the
extension for multiple features. Let feature set of Qi be Fi = {f 1i , . . . , f yi } and
(F1, . . . , Fn) be the feature sets of n queries. Simp[i[j], p[r]] =1 if f
j
i = f
r
p
and 0, otherwise, for 1 ≤ i, p ≤ n and 1 ≤ j, r ≤ y. Intuitively, similarity
pattern is the information of the number of common features between two
queries.
Definition 23. Trace (γ(Hn)) Let C = {C1, . . . , C|D|} be the set of en-
crypted documents, id(Ci) be the identifier of Ci, |Ci| be the size of Ci and
|I| be the number of buckets in the secure index I. The trace of Hn is defined
as:
γ(Hn)={(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), (|C1|, . . . , |C|D||), Ap(Hn), |I|}.
We allow to leak the trace to an adversary.
Definition 24. View (v(Hn)) is the information that is accessible by an
adversary. Let I be the searchable secure index and, id(Ci) and Q be as
defined above. The view of Hn is defined as:
v(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), C, I,Q}.
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5.7 The Two Server MinHash-based Method
In this section we explain the construction of the proposed method. The
privacy-preserving search is applied utilizing the searchable secure index that
is generated by the data owner. Given a query from a user, the search server
performs the search on the secure index without learning anything about the
query and returns the encrypted intermediate results to the file server, which
then sends the final results to the user.
5.7.1 Secure Index Generation with Query Obfusca-
tion
Our proposed method utilizes the idea of bucketization; a data partitioning
technique widely used in the literature [20, 43, 45]. Here, each object is
distributed into a constant number of buckets via the MinHash functions
introduced in Section 3.3.2 and the bucket-id is used as an identifier for each
object in that bucket. Note that, this method maps similar objects (i.e.,
documents) into the same buckets with high probability. Consequently, the
number of buckets shared by any two documents increases as the similarity
between those two documents increases. Similarly, two documents without
any common keyword do not share any bucket.
In the generation of the secure index, each document is represented by a
set called signature (cf. Section 3.3.2 for signature generation). The signa-
tures are comparable such that the distance between two documents can be
estimated by comparing their signatures. However, the signature generation
process for the single server setting given in Section 5.2.1 is deterministic,
which means that for any two queries generated from exactly the same set
of keywords, their corresponding signatures will be identical. This inevitably
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leaks the search pattern.
In this Section, we now modify the index construction and query gen-
eration methods by introducing randomness in query signature generation
phase in order to obfuscate the search pattern. The proposed secure index is
generated by the data owner utilizing the following phases, namely: feature
extraction, bucket index construction and bucket index encryption. These
three phases are explained in the following.
1. Feature Extraction: For each document Di ∈ D, the set of features
Fi = {f 1i , . . . , f yi } that characterizes the document is extracted. In our
case, those features are composed of two values f ji = (wij, rsij). The
first value is a keyword wij in the document. The second one is the
relevancy score (rsij), which is based on tf-idf value of the keyword wij
for the document Di as explained in Section 3.5. This relevancy score
is later used in the search method (cf. Section 5.7.3) while ranking the
matching results.
2. Bucket Index Construction with Obfuscation: In [38], the Min-
Hash structure is constructed by selecting λ random permutations on
the set of all possible features (∆). In the randomized method, in-
stead, λ set of random permutations are used for document signatures,
where each set is composed of φ permutations. Hence, in the proposed
method each signature is composed of φλ elements.
The MinHash functions are applied on the first values (i.e., wij) of
each feature set. Let F ∗i be the list of first elements in Fi as, F
∗
i =
{wi1, . . . , wiz}, then the signature for each document Di ∈ D is calcu-
lated as:
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Sig(Di) = {
(
hP11(F
∗
i ), . . . , hP1φ(F
∗
i )
)
, . . . ,
(
hPλ1(F
∗
i ), . . . , hPλφ(F
∗
i )
) } .
Note that, each signature element of a document is a feature (i.e.,
keyword) of that document.
Then, each document identifier is mapped to φλ buckets using the
elements of the signature of the document. Suppose hPi(F
∗
j ) = wk,
then a bucket vector is created with a bucket identifier Bik. The bucket
content vector, VBik , is a vector of integers of the size of the outsourced
data set, |D|, where initially all the values in VBik are set to 0. The
relevancy scores of all the documents that are mapped to a bucket are
then inserted to the corresponding bucket content vector. Let Bik be a
bucket identifier and VBik be the corresponding content vector then,
VBik [id(Dj)] =
rsjk, iff hPi(F
∗
j ) = B
i
k,
0, otherwise.
3. Bucket Index Encryption: Bucket identifier Bik is a sensitive infor-
mation since it may reveal a search term in a query that matches with
a bucket, so it must be encrypted. Moreover, the server should be able
to map the given encrypted bucket id to the one kept in the server
without knowing the decryption keys. Hence, the encryption method
used for hiding the bucket identifier must be a deterministic scheme.
One of the most efficient methods that hides a value in a deterministic
way is the HMAC functions, which are essentially cryptographic hash
functions that utilize secret keys. In our proposed scheme, decryption
of the encrypted bucket identifier is not required so an HMAC function
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is used for hiding the bucket identifiers. The secret key of the HMAC
function (Kid) is not revealed to the servers. We denote the encrypted
bucket identifier as piBik = HMACKid(B
i
k).
The content of a bucket (VBik) also possesses sensitive information such
as the relevancy score of each document in a bucket. Moreover, the
content vector also contains the information of pseudo identifiers of the
documents that are not mapped to that bucket since their relevancy
score will be zero. Those information must be protected from the cloud
server, hence should be outsourced to the server only after encryption.
The search over the encrypted data will be applied by the search server
and due to the security requirements, the search server cannot apply de-
cryption on the bucket content vectors. The homomorphic encryption
schemes provide a solution for this problem since they allow operations
such as addition over the ciphertext without applying decryption. We
use the Paillier encryption [29], a well known additive homomorphic en-
cryption method, for the encryption of the bucket content vectors VBik .
The Paillier encryption algorithm satisfies the following homomorphic
property;
Enc(m1) · Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 +m2).
Prior to outsourcing to the search server, each element of the con-
tent vector is encrypted using the Paillier encryption with a secret
key (Kcontent). We denote the encrypted content vector as VBik =
EncKcontent(VBik). Note that, Paillier encryption provides semantic secu-
rity against chosen plaintext attacks, hence, different encrypted outputs
of the same message will be different and the encrypted values will be
indistinguishable.
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The secure index generation method is summarized in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Two Server Index Generation
Require: ∆:set of possible keywords, D: collection of documents, h: λ Min-
Hash functions, Ψ: security parameter
Kid = Setup(Ψ), Kcontent = Setup(Ψ)
for all Di ∈ D do
Fi ← extract features of Di
Sig(Di) = {
(
hP11(F
∗
i ), . . . , hP1φ(F
∗
i )
)
, . . . ,
(
hPλ1(F
∗
i ), . . . , hPλφ(F
∗
i )
)}
for j = 1→ φλ do
Bjk = Sig(Di)[j − 1]
if Bjk /∈ bucket identifier list then
add Bjk to bucket identifier list
create VBjk
, where all elements are 0
end if
set VBjk
[id(Di)] = rsik
end for
end for
for all Bjk ∈ bucket identifier list do
piBjk
= HMACKid(B
j
k)
VBjk = EncKcontent(VBjk)
add (piBjk
,VBjk) to secure index I
end for
return I
Subsequent to the index generation, the data owner encrypts each doc-
ument in the data set D as Ωid(Di) = EncKdata(Di), using an encryption
scheme that satisfies pseudo-randomness against chosen plaintext attacks
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(PCPA) [18] (e.g., AES in CTR mode). The output of a PCPA-secure en-
cryption is indistinguishable from any random bit sequence of the same length
as the cipher text. Finally, the data owner outsources this set of encrypted
documents EDoc to the file server and the searchable index I to the search
server.
5.7.2 Randomized Query Generation
The query generation is constructed in a similar way to the index generation
phase (Section 5.7.1) and exact steps are detailed in Algorithm 8. Given
a feature set of η keywords in a query (i.e., F = {w′1, . . . , w′η}), the user
first creates the query signature from this feature set using the MinHash
functions that are used in the index generation phase. Different from the
index generation, in the signature generation phase of a query Q, only a
randomly chosen subset with c elements among the φ MinHash functions is
used as:
Sig(Q) = { (hP1j1 (F ), . . . , hP1jc (F )) , . . . ,(hPλj1 (F ), . . . , hPλjc (F )) } ,
where c < φ and ji ∈R {1, . . . , φ}.
Then, for each signature element, the corresponding bucket identifiers are
hashed with the key Kid. The query Q is therefore, the list of hashed bucket
identifiers (i.e., Q = {pi1, . . . , picλ}). Note that independent of the number of
keywords in a query (i.e., η), the query signature has always cλ elements and
therefore, the information of η is not leaked to the server.
5.7.3 Secure Search
Given a query Q, the search server finds the encrypted vectors (VBjk) corre-
sponding to the bucket identifiers in Q. Utilizing the homomorphic properties
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Algorithm 8 Two Server Query Generation
Require: F : feature set of keywords to be queried,
h: λ MinHash functions, Kid: encryption key
for i = 1→ c do
ji ∈R {1, . . . , φ}
for l = 1→ λ do
add hPlji (F ) to Sig(Q)
end for
end for
for j = 1→ cλ do
Bjk = Sig(Q)[j − 1]
piBjk
= HMACKid(B
j
k)
Q[j − 1] = piBjk
end for
return Q
of the encryption, the search server then computes an encrypted score vector
using the cλ encrypted vectors as EV =
∏cλ
i=1 Vi and sends this single en-
crypted score vector EV to the file server. After receiving EV , the file server
decrypts the vector and sorts the data identifiers. Finally, the encrypted
documents with top t relevancy scores are sent to the user, where t is an
arbitrary number, which is set in any convenient way. The two server search
method is described in Algorithm 9.
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Algorithm 9 Two-Server Secure Search
and Document Retrieval
SEARCH SERVER:
Require: I: secure index, Q: query
t: limit for the number of documents to retrieve
set EV := 1
for all pii ∈ Q do
if (pii,Vi = {ei1 , . . . , eiD}) ∈ I then
for all j = 1→ D do
EV [j] = EV [j] · eij
end for
end if
end for
send EV and t to File Server
FILE SERVER:
Require: SL : encrypted scores, Kcontent: secret key,
Kpriv : Paillier private key
for all i, EV [i] ∈ SL do
score(i) = DecKpriv (EV [i])
end for
sort all scores
send the encrypted documents with the highest t scores, to the user
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5.8 Analysis of the Method of the Search Pat-
tern Hiding
The search pattern is intuitively the search frequency of the queries, which
can be found by checking the equality between the given query and the
previous queries. Therefore, in order to hide the search pattern, identifying
equality of two queries should be infeasible, i.e., δ-mean query obfuscation
and -probability distinguishability should be satisfied.
Note that a query Qa, is a set of encrypted bucket identifiers generated
by the outputs of the chosen MinHash functions, where |Qa| = cλ (i.e.,
Qa = {pi1, . . . , picλ}).
A well-known metric for finding the similarity between two sets is the
Jaccard distance, as given in Section 3.4.2 in the preliminaries.
In this work, the Jaccard distance is utilized in order to analyze the
difference between the signatures of two queries. Hence, the Jaccard distance
function Jd is used as the distance function d given in the definition of the
δ-mean query obfuscation (cf. Definition 21).
Throughout our analysis, we use fundamental probability concepts such
as permutation and combination. The number of permutations of length k
from a set of n elements is denoted as P nk , which is equal to,
P nk =
n!
(n− k)! .
Similar to permutation, combination is the number of different ways of
selecting a set of k elements out of a group of n elements, where, unlike
permutations, order does not matter. The number of k -combinations from a
set with n elements is denoted as Cnk and equals to,
Cnk =
n!
k!(n− k)! .
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Given two queries Qa and Qb, generated from the same feature set F ,
the probability that they are not the same (i.e., Jd(Qa, Qb) > 0) can be
formulated as:
prob(Qa 6= Qb) = 1− (Cφc )−1 = 1−
c!(φ− c)!
φ!
.
This probability is almost 1, especially if the parameters are chosen as
φ = 2c, which maximizes the combination Cφc . However, inequality of two
queries does not imply indistinguishability. Let there be c¯ common elements
among the randomly chosen c MinHash functions, where 0 ≤ c¯ ≤ c. Given
the same set of keywords, the outputs of these c¯ MinHash functions will
be the same for all λ sets. Therefore, it can still be possible to distinguish
equivalent queries, if there exist common MinHash functions such that c¯ > 0.
The ultimate obfuscation is satisfied when c¯ = 0, namely there are no
common MinHash functions chosen in the generation of two queries. The
probability that the second query randomly chooses the MinHash functions
from the set of φ − c MinHash functions that are not chosen by the first
query, is calculated as:
prob (Qa ∩Qb = ∅) =
c−1∏
i=0
(
φ− c− i
φ− i
)
=
c−1∏
i=0
(
1− c
φ− i
)
=
Cφ−cc
Cφc
. (5.5)
Note that prob (Qa ∩Qb = ∅) increases as φ increases and c decreases.
Therefore, the query obfuscation can be satisfied by utilizing a large φ and
a small c pair.
Example 7. Let φ be 20 and c be 2. Given two queries Qa and Qb generated
from the same feature set, the probability that they share no common element
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(i.e., Jd(Qa, Qb) = 1) is calculated as:
prob (Qa ∩Qb = ∅) = C
φ−c
c
Cφc
=
C182
C202
=
18
20
· 17
19
= 0.805.
With this parameter setting, the probability that two equivalent queries
have totally unrelated signatures is greater than 80%, and this probability can
further be increased by increasing φ.
Query obfuscation provides, same or similar queries look unrelated. How-
ever, if the server can correlate queries with the matching document identi-
fiers, then similar queries can still be distinguished by comparing the com-
mon matching documents. Therefore, the two server search setting, which
hides correlation between queries and the matching document identifiers, has
paramount importance for the security of the method.
5.8.1 Expected Jaccard Distance
In the case, where two queries are generated from the same feature set F , the
two queries have a common element if and only if the same MinHash function
is used. The intuitive proof is as follows. If all the MinHash functions
are different, by definition the outputs will be different since the MinHash
functions identify the matching bucket identifiers and hence, the two queries
will not have any common element. If there exists a MinHash function
common for both queries, since the inputs for that function are the same,
the outputs will also be the same.
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Let Qa and Qb be two queries generated from the same feature set F . Us-
ing Equation (3.1), the Jaccard distance between the two queries is calculated
as:
Jd(Qa, Qb) = 1− c¯λ
2cλ− c¯λ , (5.6)
where c¯ is the number of common MinHash functions chosen by Qa and Qb.
Note that if c¯ = 0, the distance is Jd(Qa, Qb) = 1 − 0 = 1, which leaks
no information that the two queries are related. However, if c¯ = c then the
distance is Jd(Qa, Qb) = 1− 1 = 0, which leaks the information that the two
queries are equivalent.
In the case, where two queries are generated from different feature sets,
the corresponding signatures may still have common elements if there are
some common keywords in their feature sets. Let two queries, Qa and Qb,
have ηa and ηb keywords in their feature sets, respectively and η¯ be the
number of common keywords in the two feature sets. Further, let c¯ be as
defined above, then the Jaccard distance between two different queries Qa
and Qb can be estimated as:
Jd(Qa, Qb) = 1−
η¯2
ηaηb
c¯λ
2cλ−
(
η¯2
ηaηb
c¯λ
) . (5.7)
Equation (5.7) is almost the same as the case, where queries are equivalent
as given in Equation (5.6), except for the factor (η¯2/ηaηb). This factor is the
probability that a MinHash function gives the same output for two input
sets with lengths ηa and ηb, where η¯ elements are common in both sets. Note
that, the MinHash functions are random permutations and the output is one
of the elements in the input with uniform distribution. The probability that
a MinHash function gives the same output for the two sets with ηa and ηb
elements, where η¯ of them are common, is calculated in the following way.
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With probability η¯/ηa, one of the common elements is chosen from the set
of the query, Qa. For the second set, Qb, due to the MinHash property of
the functions, the minimum value of the common elements will be the same
as the first set, but different for non-common elements. Hence, the same
element will be the output of the function with probability η¯/ηb. Therefore,
the probability that a MinHash function gives the same output for the two
input sets is calculated as η¯2/ηaηb. Note that if η¯ = 0, the distance is
Jd(Qa, Qb) = 1−0 = 1, which hides any possible correlation as in the case of
equivalent queries. Similarly, if η¯ = ηa = ηb, then equations (5.6) and (5.7)
become the same.
The Jaccard distance between two queries, depends on the number of
MinHash functions shared in their signatures; the lower the functions shared,
the higher the distance. The expected value of the Jaccard distance can
be estimated by calculating the probability that the number of common
MinHash functions in the two query signatures is i, (i.e., c¯ = i). Let Pc¯(i) be
the probability that c¯ = i, the expected Jaccard distance between any two
queries Qa and Qb is estimated as:
Exp [Jd(Qa, Qb)] =
c∑
i=0
Pc¯(i)Jdi(Qa, Qb), (5.8)
where Jdi(Qa, Qb) is the Jaccard distance for c¯ = i.
The probability Pc¯(i) is equal to the probability that i elements are chosen
from c elements and c − i are chosen from φ − c elements. First, consider
the ordered case such that the first i elements are chosen from c, followed by
c− i elements are chosen from φ− c elements. This probability is calculated
as:
P ci P
φ−c
c−i
P φc
However, in our case the order is not important, so there are Cci different
116
ways of choosing these elements. Therefore, the probability Pc¯(i) is calculated
as:
Pc¯(i) = C
c
i
P ci P
φ−c
c−i
P φc
(5.9)
=
c!
i!(c− i)!
c!
(c− i)!
(φ− c)!
(φ− 2c+ i)!
(φ− c)!
φ!
.
In Table 5.1, the values of Pc¯(i) are presented for φ = 15 to 25, where c
is 2. Note that
∑c
i=0 Pc¯(i) = 1.
φ i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 sum
15 0,7429 0,2476 0,0095 1
16 0,7583 0,2333 0,0083 1
17 0,7721 0,2206 0,0074 1
18 0,7843 0,2092 0,0065 1
19 0,7953 0,1988 0,0058 1
20 0,8053 0,1895 0,0053 1
21 0,8143 0,1810 0,0048 1
22 0,8225 0,1732 0,0043 1
23 0,83 0,1660 0,004 1
24 0,837 0,1594 0,0036 1
25 0,8433 0,1533 0,0033 1
Table 5.1: Pc¯(i) for different φ values
The distance between equivalent queries converges to 1 (i.e., ultimate
obfuscation) as φ increases; however, this also increases the number of buckets
in the secure index I, which inevitably increases the storage requirements and
the search time. Therefore, we set φ = 20, which satisfies sufficient security
while still keeping the size of I within practical limits.
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Example 8. Let φ be 20 and c be 2, the expected distance between two equiv-
alent queries Qa and Qb that are generated using the same feature set, is
calculated as follows.
Pc¯(i) will be as:
Pc¯(0) =
2!
0!2!
2!
2!
18!
16!
18!
20!
=
17 · 18
19 · 20 = 0.8053,
Pc¯(1) =
2!
1!1!
2!
1!
18!
17!
18!
20!
=
2 · 2 · 18
19 · 20 = 0.1895,
Pc¯(2) =
2!
2!0!
2!
0!
18!
18!
18!
20!
=
2
19 · 20 = 0.0052.
Note that
∑c
i=0 Pc¯(i) = 0.8053 + 0.1895 + 0.0052 = 1.
The Jaccard distance is calculated as:
Jd0(Qa, Qb) = 1−
0
4λ
= 1,
Jd1(Qa, Qb) = 1−
λ
3λ
=
2
3
,
Jd2(Qa, Qb) = 1−
2λ
2λ
= 0.
Then the expected Jaccard distance between Qa and Qb is:
Exp [Jd(Qa, Qb)]=0.8053 · 1 + 0.1895 · 2
3
+ 0.0052 · 0=0.932,
which shows, even if two queries are generated from identical feature sets,
they have a significantly large distance in-between that makes it difficult to
distinguish them from the queries generated from different feature sets.
5.9 Security Analysis of the Two Server Method
In this section, we provide the formal definitions that show the proposed
scheme satisfies the privacy requirements defined in Section 5.6.
Theorem 6. The proposed method satisfies -probability distinguishability in
accordance with Definition 20.
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Proof. An upper bound for the probability that, two queries, Qa and Qb,
that have a common keyword w in the corresponding feature sets, have a
common bucket identifier, can be found as:
prob(Qa ∩Qb 6= ∅) = 1− prob(Qa ∩Qb = ∅)
≤ 1− Pc¯(0)
≤ , (5.10)
where  is a security parameter.
Theorem 7. The proposed query randomization method satisfies δ-mean
query obfuscation in accordance with Definition 21.
Proof. Recall that, three queries Q,Qb and Q1−b are defined in Definition 21,
where Qb and Q are generated from the same set of features and b ∈R {0, 1}.
Without loss of generality, let b = 0. For the case, where two queries are
different, we assume the worst case, in which they do not share any common
keyword (i.e., η¯ = 0). In this case Jd(Q,Q1) will be 1.
For the case, where two queries are equivalent, with probability Pc¯(0), Q
and Q0 will not share any common MinHash functions and Jd(Q,Q0) will
be 1. With probability 1 − Pc¯(0), which is small but non-negligible, the
equivalent queries will share c¯ common MinHash functions and the Jaccard
distance between those two queries will be less than one. In this case, the
distance between the two queries can be estimated using the expected value
given in Equation (5.8) as:
Exp[Jd(Q,Qb)] =
c∑
i=0
Pc¯(i)Jdi(Q,Qb).
This expected distance converges to 1 as φ→∞ and as the analysis given in
Section 5.8.1 shows, Exp [Jd(Q,Qb)] gets very close to 1 for reasonable values
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of φ. Therefore, if the security parameters c and φ are set appropriately, then
Exp[|Jd(Q,Q0)− Jd(Q,Q1)|] = |(≈ 1)− 1| < δ, (5.11)
where δ is a security parameter.
For the case, where the Jaccard distance between any two queries is not
one, we leak the information that the corresponding feature sets of the two
queries share at least one keyword. This is especially true since two queries
with no common keyword in their feature sets, will have always Jaccard
distance one. However, the method is still good since the server or the
adversary cannot attack using background information on the statistics of
the search terms used. The properties of the method that thwart background
attacks, are clarified below.
We assume an adversary may have some background information on the
data set, such that the search frequencies of the most frequently queried key-
words are known. There are two main properties of the proposed method that
avert attacks using background information. Firstly, most of the statistical
information is obfuscated using the randomized query generation method,
explained in Section 5.7.2. Secondly, the probability in Equation (5.10) de-
pends on η, which is the number of keywords in the feature sets of the
queries. As the distribution of the number of keywords in each query may
significantly vary, the correlation of the actual search frequencies with the
similarities between the collection of queries is hard to distinguish.
The correlation of the original search statistics and the statistics gathered
from the queries is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn} be a collection of n queries and
w be a keyword that occurs in pw percent of the queries in Q. Given Q, w
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and pw, in the proposed scheme, it is hard to obtain the set of queries in Q
that contains the keyword w.
Proof. We assume that the adversary A, having observed a collection of
queries, Q, knows that a keyword w occurs in pw percent of the set Q. Let
there be n queries in Q.
The probability that a query Qi ∈ Q, where w ∈ Fi contains a specific
bucket identifier piw, is
c
φηi
since only a single MinHash function can produce
the piw output and that function exists in Qi with probability c/φ. There
are pw|Q| queries that contain the keyword w, hence the expected number of
queries that contain a specific encrypted identifier piw, in their signatures is,
#i(Qi ⊃ piw) = ∀i, w ∈ Fi
∑
i
c
φηi
(5.12)
= pw|Q| · c
φ
· Avg
(
1
ηi
)
.
Let pw and pw′ be the frequencies of the two most frequent keywords, w
and w′ respectively, in Q, (i.e., pw > pw′). Depending on the values of η
corresponding to the queries containing w and w′, the expected number of
queries containing the encrypted bucket identifier piw′ may be greater than
the number of queries containing piw. As there are several different keywords
with various occurrence frequencies in the queries, where η values of the
queries are unknown, it is hard to correlate the occurrence frequencies of
the keywords with the cardinality of the sets of queries that share a specific
encrypted bucket identifier.
Considering the fact that, with high probability, the Jaccard distance
between two queries generated from the same feature set is 1 and distribution
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of the number of keywords in queries is unknown to the adversary, correlating
the original keyword search frequency with Q is hard.
We illustrate the arguments about the hardness of correlating statistics
with Q for the proposed method in the following example.
Example 9. For an extreme case, let the adversary learn 106 queries (i.e.,
|Q| = 106). Further let, φ = 20, c = 2, the frequency of the most frequent
keyword w be 10% and let there be a set of other keywords w′i that each occurs
in 8% of the queries in Q. We assume the number of keywords in a query,
η, is chosen uniformly random in the range [2, 5].
As, η is chosen uniformly randomly in the range [2, 5], the mean (i.e.,
expected) value of (1/η) is
Avg
(
1
η
)
=
1
4
(
1
2
+
1
3
+
1
4
+
1
5
)
= 0.32.
Hence, on average, the number of queries that share a common encrypted
bucket identifier due to the keyword w (i.e., the most frequent keyword) is:
= pw|Q| · c
φ
· Avg
(
1
ηi
)
= 0.1 · 106 · 2
20
· 0.32
= 3200
On the other hand, for each i, depending on the values of η, the expected
number of queries that share a common encrypted bucket identifier due to a
less frequent keyword w′i will be distributed in the range:
= [0.08 · 106 · 2
20
· 0.2, 0.08 · 106 · 2
20
· 0.5]
= [1600, 4000].
122
The number of keywords in each query is assumed to be uniformly random,
hence there may be several bucket identifiers, piw′i, such that although the
occurrence frequency of w′i is less than the occurrence frequency of w, the
number of queries that share a common bucket due to the keyword w′i is
greater than the number of queries that share a bucket identifier due to w.
This example shows that, it is very hard to correlate two equivalent
queries with exactly the same set of search terms, due to the randomiza-
tion phase we propose.
We also confirm this claim with an experiment using the statistics of
the real data set [49]. The occurrence frequencies of the keywords in the
queries, Q, are chosen according to the term frequencies of the corresponding
keywords in the data set. It is observed that on the average, among the sets
of queries that share a bucket identifier, only in 20% of the experiments,
the set with the largest cardinality corresponds to the keyword with greatest
occurrence frequency. Moreover, the correlation between the cardinality of
the sets and the term frequencies of keywords is further corrupted as the
term frequencies decrease. This is due to the existence of several keywords
with very similar occurrence frequencies.
Theorem 8. The proposed method satisfies adaptive semantic security in
accordance with Definition 11.
Proof. Let the original view v(Hn) and the trace γ(Hn) be
v(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), C, I,Q}
γ(Hn) = {(id(C1), . . . , id(C|D|)), (|C1|, . . . , |C|D||), Ap(Hn), |I|}.
Further let v∗(Hn) = {(id∗(C1), . . . , id∗(C|D|)), C∗, I∗,Q∗} be the view simu-
lated by a simulator S. The proposed method is adaptive semantically secure
if v(Hn) is indistinguishable from v
∗(Hn).
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• The first component of the view v(Hn) is the pseudo identifiers of the
documents, id(Ci), which are also available in the trace. Hence, S can
trivially simulate document identifiers as id∗(Ci) = id(Ci). Since for
all possible values of i, id∗(Ci) = id(Ci), they are indistinguishable.
• Each document is encrypted using a PCPA-secure encryption method.
Note that, the output of a PCPA-secure encryption method [18] is by
definition indistinguishable from a random number that has the same
size as the ciphertext. To simulate ciphertexts C, S assigns l random
numbers to C∗ such that C∗ = {C∗1 , . . . , C∗|D|}, where ∀i, |C∗i | = |Ci|
using the size information of each ciphertext, which is available in the
trace. Considering that for all i, Ci and C
∗
i are indistinguishable, C
and C∗ are also indistinguishable.
• Note that I is composed of encrypted bucket identifiers and corre-
sponding encrypted bucket content vectors. Let sizeB and sizeV be
the sizes of bucket identifier and bucket content, respectively. Simula-
tor S generates |I| index elements, I∗[i] = (pi∗i ,V∗i ) such that pi∗i is a
random number, where |pi∗i | = sizeB and V∗i is a vector of size sizeV
such that each element is a random number of size of the Paillier en-
cryption modulus. Note that pi∗i and pii are indistinguishable since pii is
the output of a cryptographic hash function (i.e., HMAC), where the
output is indistinguishable from a random number. Similarly, V∗i and
Vi are indistinguishable since each element of Vi is a ciphertext of a
Paillier encryption method, which provides semantic security. Hence,
I is indistinguishable from I∗.
• Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} is a set of n queries, where each query Qi is com-
posed of cλ encrypted bucket identifiers. Encrypted bucket identifiers
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(pi∗i ) can be simulated by the S as shown in the previous case. S can
simulate the queries using the previously simulated bucket identifiers,
pi∗i . For each Q
∗
i , cλ random simulated bucket identifiers are chosen
from the simulated index I∗. Note that real and simulated encrypted
bucket identifiers are indistinguishable from each other. Hence, for all
i, Qi is indistinguishable from Q
∗
i and following from this, Q is indis-
tinguishable from Q∗.
The simulated view v∗ is indistinguishable from the genuine view v since
components of v and v∗ are indistinguishable. Henceforth, the proposed
method satisfies adaptive semantic security.
5.10 Compressing Content Vector
The two server search method given in Section 5.7.3 requires the search server
to send a vector of encrypted scores to the file server, where the size of the
vector is in the order of the size of the data set (i.e., |D|). The search server
cannot know the scores of the documents, therefore an encrypted score of
each document, including those with 0 score, should be sent. Although it is
transparent to the users, creation and forwarding of this score vector necessi-
tates a considerable communication and computation costs on both servers.
In order to mitigate this cost, we propose combining several document scores
in a single vector entry while still providing the correctness of the results and
privacy of individual scores.
Note that each entry of an encrypted content vector V is encrypted one by
one, using the Paillier encryption and the final encrypted scores vector, EV ,
is the element-wise product of the encrypted content vectors corresponding
to the query. Let µ be the Paillier modulus, then each message is an element
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of Zµ. However, each score that is stored on the content vector is much
smaller than µ, which brings forth an unnecessary increase in the size of the
EV . Instead of encrypting each single score separately, we propose encoding
several score values on each log(µ) bit message such that each score can
still be summed up using the homomorphic addition property of the Paillier
encryption method.
Let maximum possible score value be bmax bits. During the search process,
the search server applies summation on the cλ score vectors corresponding to
the query of the user. Hence, in the final score vector, the score of a document
can at most be log(cλ) + bmax bits after the summation of cλ score values. In
the proposed compressed score vector method, each score value is stored in a
log(cλ)+bmax bit part of the log(µ) bit message. With this method, each score
vector element can keep up to log(µ)/(log(cλ) + bmax) document score values
and these plain score values are then encrypted with the Paillier encryption
by the data owner as in the case without compression. Reserving log(cλ) +
bmax bits for each document score eliminates the possibility of any overflow
after the summation. Hence, it is guaranteed that the correct accumulated
scores can be received by the file server after decryption.
The compression of the content vector is depicted in the following exam-
ple.
Example 10. The content vector is represented in base 10 instead of binary
for visualization purposes. As a toy example, let there be only 12 documents
in the data set, and each score is in the range [0 − 99] (i.e., 2 digits). Also
let cλ ≤ 10, hence 3 digits will be reserved for each score. Let V1 and V2 be
two encrypted vectors for 12 document scores. The homomorphic addition of
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the two vectors is shown as follows.
V1 · V2 =
=

E(015032035000)
E(000027052000)
E(000034000000)
 ·

E(000082000012)
E(000000042000)
E(000015000000)

=

E(015114035012)
E(000027094000)
E(000049000000)

In this example, each encrypted vector element stores four scores instead
of a single score. Although a single homomorphic addition is depicted here,
in the actual model, the sum of cλ encrypted vectors are calculated. The
additional log(cλ) bits (e.g., 1 digit in this case), eliminate the possibility of
any overflow after the summation. Therefore, the accumulated score can be
received without any corruption.
Using the compressed score vector method, the size of the final accumu-
lated score vector EV is reduced by the order of log(µ)/(log(cλ) + bmax),
which decrease both the communication and storage costs at this order. In
Section 5.11, possible values for bmax, µ and λ are presented, which shows
that compressed score vector method provides significant increase in the ef-
ficiency of the keyword search scheme.
5.11 Experiments (Two Server)
In this section, we extensively analyze the proposed method in order to
demonstrate and compare its efficiency and effectiveness. The entire sys-
tem is implemented by Java language using a 64-bit Windows 7 operating
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system with Intel Xeon processor with 6 cores of 3.2 GHz. In our experi-
ments we use both the RCV1 (Reuters Corpus Volume 1), which is a corpus
of newswire stories that is made available by Reuters, Ltd. [49] and the Enron
data set [51].
The success of the search method is analyzed using the precision and
recall metrics (cf. Section3.6).
The matching items are ordered according to their relevancy with the
given query (cf. Section 3.5) and only the top items that have the highest t
scores are retrieved. In our experimental setting, we test the accuracy of the
method with various number of MinHash functions (λ) using the precision
and recall metrics. As Figures 5.6 and 5.7 demonstrate, both precision and
recall increase as λ increases. Even though, higher λ provides better search
accuracy, it also increases the storage requirements and the computation cost
of the index generation. We therefore set λ as 125, which is the smallest value
that provides sufficiently high recall rate.
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Figure 5.6: Precision rates, where η is 2, 3 and 4 with various λ values
The effect of the number of keywords in a query (i.e., η) on the pre-
cision rate depends on several parameters. As η increases, the number of
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Figure 5.7: Recall rates, where η is 2, 3 and 4 with various λ values
common keywords with the matching documents also increases. The number
of common buckets between a query and a document signature increases as
the number of common keywords increases, which also increases their scores.
Hence the increase in the number of keywords in a query has a positive ef-
fect on the precision rate. On the other hand, when the number of queried
keywords increases, documents that contain a large subset of the queried
keywords may also have a high score and therefore be retrieved by the user.
However, those matches decrease precision unless they contain all the queried
terms. Therefore, it is not possible to give a direct relation between η and
precision rate. The correlation with the recall rate however, is straightfor-
ward. As the number of queried keywords increases, the number of elements
in the set of documents that contain all the keywords (i.e., |D(F )|) signifi-
cantly decreases, which increases the recall values.
It is important to note that, although the precision rates are not high, all
the matches that are returned to the user contain at least a non-empty subset
of the queried terms. The precision and recall metrics do not consider the
parameters like term frequency and rarity that are used in the scoring of the
proposed method. Hence, due to the tf-idf based scoring, some documents
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that have partial match with the query may get a higher rank compared to
a document with a full match. Although the documents with partial match
is counted as a false match in calculating the precision, we claim that docu-
ments that have partial match with the query may also be important for the
user, due to the high relevancy score (i.e., high tf-idf values of the matching
keywords). Moreover, the precision rate also depends on the threshold t. For
the case, where only the top 10 matches are retrieved, then the average preci-
sion rate is 98, 5%. Therefore, we also tested the precision and recall rates of
the proposed method for the case only top t percent of the documents with
non-zero scores are retrieved by the user. The results, given in Figure 5.8,
demonstrate that as more documents are retrieved, the precision decreases
as some of the retrieved items do not contain all the queried keywords. Sim-
ilarly, as less number of documents are retrieved, the precision increases but
recall drops since some of the matching documents are not retrieved. By
setting the t variable appropriately, the user may either retrieve only a small
number of documents with high precision or all the related documents where
some only contain a non-empty subset of the queried features. Therefore, the
accuracy of our method is suitable for most of the practical requirements.
Utilizing the compression method explained in Section 5.10, several indi-
vidual scores can be stored in a single homomorphic encrypted value. In our
experimental setting, each score is represented with 10 bits (i.e., bmax = 10),
we set λ = 125 and c = 2 hence, after adding cλ scores, the final score of each
document is represented with log2(250)+10 = 18 bits. In the Paillier encryp-
tion, we use 1024 bit messages, which enables keeping 1024/18 = 56 scores
in a single encryption instead of a single score. With this novel method, the
storage requirements of the search server, the communication cost between
the search server and the file server, the number of Paillier encryption per-
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Figure 5.8: Precision and recall rates, where t% of documents with non-zero
scores are retrieved
formed by the data owner and the number of decryption performed by the file
server are all reduced 56 times. This improvement can further be extended
by using smaller bmax or λ.
The most time consuming operation of the proposed method is the genera-
tion of the secure searchable index, where the bottleneck is the homomorphic
encryption operations. Each element of all content vectors are encrypted us-
ing the Paillier encryption, where the number of content vectors depends on
both the number of different features in the data set and number of MinHash
functions used. The index generation timings for various data set sizes are
presented in Figure 5.9. Although the index generation times are in the order
of several minutes, since this operation is done only once in an oﬄine stage,
the efficiency of the proposed method is still high.
The most crucial operation of the proposed method is the search over the
secure index. There can be several users in the system and the query rate can
therefore be very high, but the users should still be able to rapidly retrieve
the responses. The search operation explained in Section 5.7.3 has two time-
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Figure 5.9: Timing results for index generation as data set size changes for
various λ values
consuming operations. Firstly, the search server multiplies the encrypted
scores of the queried bucket vectors for applying homomorphic summation
of the scores and sends this single accumulated encrypted score vector EV
to the file server. Secondly, after receiving EV , the file server decrypts each
vector element and sorts the data identifiers. The search time for various
data set sizes are presented in Figure 5.10. The search operation works in
the order of a few seconds with parallel processing in the six core server used
in our experiments. The timings can further be decreased utilizing parallel
processing with more powerful servers. Note that, each decryption and ho-
momorphic addition operation are independent and therefore can trivially be
parallelized.
We do not provide any comparison with the work that are for vendor
system such as private information retrieval methods or solutions for store
and forward system such as the PEKS based methods. We also do not provide
any comparison with single keyword search methods since all those works are
not suitable for the problem we consider. Some of the existing work in the
literature [21, 52] including the preliminary version of this work [38] that
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Figure 5.10: Timing results for the search operation as data set size changes
for λ = 125
use single server, can provide much faster search operation. However, none
of those methods provides query indistinguishability or obfuscation, which
has crucial importance for hiding the content of a query. The work of Cao
et al. [23] provides query indistinguishability but since the queries can be
correlated with the scores of matching documents, the similarity between
queries can still be revealed (i.e., reveals search pattern). Another recent
work by Orencik and Savas [40] also provides a secure search method that
hides the search pattern. The drawback of the method in [40] is the ranking
approach used. The method supports only a fixed number of rank levels,
where all the documents that match with the same level have the same rank
such that, ranks of two documents will be the same even if one contains all
the queried terms infrequently and the other one contains all the queried
terms very frequently except only one infrequent term. Moreover, in [40],
some fake document index entries are introduced in the searchable index.
The fake documents may match with the query, which is used for hiding
the search pattern. However, the user needs to sanitize the final result from
the fake matches, which imposes an extra burden on the user. There is a
strict tradeoff between privacy and efficiency, and we managed to increase the
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privacy of the method by an acceptable level of increase in the computational
cost.
5.12 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we addressed the privacy-preserving multi-keyword search
over encrypted cloud data for the database outsourcing model (i.e., public
storage system) using locality hash functions. We first utilize a single server
scheme that use an efficient secure index method using MinHash functions.
We also incorporate ranking capability to the proposed scheme utilizing well
known tf-idf based relevancy scoring. This approach ensures that only the
most relevant items are retrieved by the user, preventing unnecessary commu-
nication and computation burden on the user. However, this single approach
leaks the search pattern for efficiency reasons. We then utilize the two server
search method for hiding the correlation between the queries and correspond-
ing matching identifiers. Utilizing the two server search method, the δ-mean
query obfuscation and -probability distinguishability properties, the pro-
posed method satisfies the requirement of hiding search pattern, which most
of the work in the literature fail to provide. We also propose a novel method
that enables storing more than 50 scores at each element of the encrypted
content vector. This approach reduces both the number of decryption opera-
tions on the file server side and the communication between the search server
and the file server more than 50 times compared to the standard approach,
where each score is encrypted one by one.
We provide formal security definitions and prove that our proposed work
satisfies adaptive semantic security, δ-mean query obfuscation and -probability
distinguishability. We implement the entire system and demonstrate the ef-
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fectiveness and efficiency of our solution through extensive experiments using
the publicly available Reuters dataset [49].
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS and FUTURE
WORK
Cloud computing is today’s one of the most exciting computing paradigms
in information technology. With the tremendous computation and storage
capacity advantages, cloud computing creates a fundamental shift in deliver-
ing computing services. Enterprises are motivated to outsource the burden
of computation to clouds such that they can avoid purchasing and manag-
ing software and hardware. However, security and privacy are perceived as
primary obstacles to its wide adoption. Although designing security into
the cloud benefits users and cloud server providers, it inevitably increases
overhead for both.
Privacy preserving search over encrypted cloud data has been extensively
studied in recent years. Although several methods are proposed in the lit-
erature, non of them can provide an optimal solution that is both fully pri-
vacy preserving and also very efficient. In this thesis, we aim to provide
a secure keyword search method that provides the privacy of the sensitive
data of the users in an efficient manner. We proposed three different secure
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search methods. The first method is a hash based search scheme that pro-
vides very efficient and accurate search over encrypted data. The proposed
privacy-preserving search scheme essentially implements an efficient method
to satisfy query unlinkability based on query and response randomization
and cryptographic techniques. Query randomization cost is negligible for
the data controller and even less for the user. Response randomization, on
the other hand, results in a communication overhead when the response to
a query is returned to the user since some fake matches are included in the
response. However, we show that the overhead can be minimized with the
optimal choice of parameters. The only flow of this method is the scoring
method utilized. This work supports only a fixed number of rank levels,
where all the documents that match with the same level have the same rank
such that, ranks of two documents will be the same even if one contains all
the queried terms infrequently and the other one contains all the queried
terms very frequently except only one infrequent term.
The second method, single server MinHash based scheme, provides very
efficient search and also incorporate ranking capability to the proposed scheme
utilizing well known tf-idf based relevancy scoring. As several work in the
literature do, we also allow to leak search pattern for efficiency concerns in
the single server method. Thirdly we utilize a two server scheme that uses
the same secure searchable index structure used in the single server method.
With the addition of a second server and a novel query obfuscation method,
we managed to enhance the privacy of the method such that the search pat-
tern is also hidden.
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6.1 Future Directions
The main issue we considered in this thesis is secure keyword search over
encrypted cloud data. We aim to extend the research on secure data-mining
over encrypted cloud data. The two of the techniques we want to cover
is secure k-nearest neighbour and range queries. Another research interest
is the BigData concept. The BigData has some challenges that is not yet
considered for encrypted data. The challenges include capture, curation,
storage, search, sharing, transfer, analysis and visualization. One of the most
important cases in the BigData is that the data is changing very frequently,
which makes keeping a static searchable index infeasible. Hence, data-mining
on encrypted BigData is still an open problem that we want to consider.
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